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VALUING AND NURTURING MULTIPLE
INTELLIGENCES IN LEGAL EDUCATION:
A PARADIGM SHIFT
Kirsten A. Dauphinais*
And these tend inward to me, and I tend outward to them,
And such as it is to be of these more or less I am,
And of these one and all I weave the song of myself.'
Because the range of intellectual capacities and activities generally
valued and developed in law schools is narrower than the range
needed to do the work of lawyers, students do not learn the full
spectrum of intellectual activities necessary to professional
excellence. The relatively narrow range of intellectual capacities
and activities valued and developed in law schools also does not
engage students as fully as possible. We hypothesize that if law
schools are to produce graduates capable of professional
excellence, they must be systematic and self-conscious about the
development of a broad spectrum of relevant cognitive processes.
Furthermore, if law schools presented lawyering as something that
implicates a variety of relevant intellectual capacities, students
would engage more fully in the development of their capacities. In
particular, students whose concerns, interests, and/or practiced
ways of working have been heretofore neglected will feel less
alienated, perform better across the range of cognitive activities,
and develop a more positive sense of professional role. As we...
have begun to articulate, analyze, and teach the neglected
capacities, we have found it useful to draw upon the work of
psychologists whose efforts to explore a broader spectrum of
human capacity precede and parallel our own.2
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Professor Peggy Cooper Davis of the New York University School
of Law has identified a3 problem of exclusivity at the fine law school at
which she teaches, and together with her colleagues, has established the
Workways program to begin to remedy the problem.4 However, such an
approach has not taken hold in legal education, generally, where we law
professors continue, overall, to admit, educate, evaluate, and mentor our
students pursuant to very traditional notions of what it means to be bright.
The majority of law schools emphasize and measure [sic] only the
logical-mathematical type because the usual method of evaluating
student performance is a single exam that asks students to analyze
a complex set of facts, in a limited time period, in writing.
Arguably, this is a limited view of intelligence that does not
adequately reflect all the types of intelligence that the successful
lawyer needs. Effective teachers find ways to teach and evaluate a
broader range of intelligences, and they encourage their students to
master more than one type.
5
This article explores Harvard Education Professor Howard Gardner's Theory
of Multiple Intelligences (MI) and endorses the proposition that taking a
new, more expansive approach to recognizing and evaluating student
capabilities could help us to provide a better legal education in several
arenas.
Part I of this article will explore the history and criteria of traditional
intelligence theory and how Howard Gardner sought to redefine these with
the 1983 inauguration of his MI theory. Part II explores the nature of each of
his identified intelligences and how they could apply to, the tasks of
lawyering. Part Ill of the article commences the application of MI theory to
legal education, beginning, as it is said, at the beginning with law school
admissions. Part IV explores Professor Davis' hypothesis by applying MI
theory to legal pedagogy and testing and proposes one alternate paradigm in
advocating the use of simulations in the law school classroom. Part V of the
article raises the author's own hypothesis that MI theory could play an
invaluable role in the mentoring of law students regarding their career
choices. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of possible critiques
to the application of MI theory to legal education and ultimately finds that,
although fraught with challenge, the use of MI theory in our pedagogy
provides great hope for the constructive evolution of law teaching. "There is
3 Some would say "yet another ....
4 Davis, supra note 2.
5 Paula Lustbader, Principle 7: Good Practice Respects Diverse Talents and Ways of Learning,
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 448, 455 (1999).
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a search to reclaim the public image and the soul of the profession. There is
a search to reclaim the joy, pride, and integrity of the profession.' 6 Multiple
Intelligence theory could be the "X that marks the spot."
I.
Traditional intelligence theorists see intelligence as a single,
invariable faculty that is stronger in some people than in others.
Its development follows a predictable pattern. The strength of
one's instrument can be determined by standardized testing at a
relatively young age and remains constant through a lifetime. The
traditionalists held that people of high intelligence excel at a broad
range of mental tasks. Testing to measure general intelligence
began around the turn of the nineteenth century, when Alfred Binet
and Theodore Simon developed the first modem tests in an effort
to identify retarded children. There was great enthusiasm for
standardized testing during the first half of the twentieth century as
modernism and the lure of rational rule obeying and a scientific
world dominated American culture. The assumption of a single,
superordinate intelligence remains the received wisdom.
7
It was this ethos that Howard Gardner flew in the face of with the
1983 publication of his landmark educational psychology work Frames of
Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences.8 Gardner conceived the work as
a new theory of human intellectual competences to challenge the classical
view of intelligence 9 as embodied by the Binet IQ Test,10 "that intelligence is
6 Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about
Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 49 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119, 133 (1997).
7 Ian Weinstein, Testing Multiple Intelligences: Comparing Evaluation by Simulation and
Written Exam, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 250-51 (2001); see also HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE
REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 34 (1999) [hereinafter GARDNER,
REFRAMED].
8 HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1983)
[hereinafter GARDNER, FRAMES].
9 See GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 5.
10 See GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 11-13. Prominent critical race scholar Richard
Delgado asserts that the originators of the standardized testing movement, such as Binet, subscribed to
eugenic theories that viewed nonwhites and people of Southern European origin to be genetically inferior.
Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest? 10 Reasons Why UC-Davis Should
Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593,
595 (2001). [hereinafter Delgado, Elitism]. See also JAMES CROUSE & DALE TRUSHEIM, THE CASE
AGAINST THE SAT 21 (1988). Howard Gardner himself takes perhaps a more gentle view of any
prejudice that might be extant in our culture regarding this matter:
I believe that in our society we suffer from three biases, which I have nicknamed
"Westist," "Testist," and "Bestist." "Westist" involves putting certain Western
cultural values, which date back to Socrates, on a pedestal. Logical thinking, for
example, is important; rationality is important; but they are not the only virtues.
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a single faculty and that one is either 'smart' or 'stupid' across the board."'"1
The Binet IQ test, Gardner contends, has "predictive power for success in
schooling, but relatively little predictive power outside the school context."
1 2
It was the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget who actually began the
modern MI movement evolving away from Binet's work by asserting that "it
is not the accuracy of a child's response on an IQ test that is important, but
rather the lines of reasoning the child invokes." 13  However Piaget, unlike
Gardner, characterized "the form of logical-rational thought prized in the
West" to be the final and highest stage of human intellectual development.
14
Gardner, through research largely with individuals afflicted with injury
or on individuals who otherwise demonstrated great skill or great deficiency
in particular, rather than general, intellectual capacities, 5 tried to devise a
theory that is more inclusive.' 6 "[It is] another view of intelligence, aptitudes
"Testist" suggests a bias toward focusing upon those human abilities or approaches
that are readily testable. If it can't be tested, it sometimes seems, it is not worth
paying attention to. My feeling is that assessment can be much broader, much more
humane than it is now, and that psychologists should spend less time ranking
people and more time trying to help them.
"Bestist" is a not very veiled reference to a book by David Halberstam called The
Best and The Brightest. Halberstam referred ironically to figures such as Harvard
faculty members who were brought to Washington to help President John F.
Kennedy and in the process launched the Vietnam War. I think that any belief that
all the answers to a given problem lie in one certain approach, such as logical-
mathematical thinking, can be very dangerous. Current views of intellect need to
be leavened with other more comprehensive points of view.
HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY IN PRACTICE 12 (1993) [hereinafter
GARDNER, PRACTICE].
11 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 34.
12 See id. at 3, 16.
13 See id. at 17.
14 See id. at 19. Gardner states that Piaget's theories regarding the supremacy of scientific
thinking were his "targets." GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at xi.
It should be noted that Piaget offers no explanation for why logical reasoning might be imperfect or
break down in adults. For example, consider the following syllogism:
Premise 1: If Rupert is a dog, then Rupert walks on four legs.
Premise 2: Rupert is not a dog.
Conclusion: Rupert does not walk on four legs.
Seventy-five percent of adults in one study incorrectly answered that this logical fallacy called "denying
the antecedent," IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 357 (9th ed. 1994), is sound.
Piaget's theory does not or cannot explain this breakdown in reasoning. Thus, 75% of adults fall at the
kind of logical intelligence Piaget says counts the most. CAMILLE B. WORTMAN & ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS, PSYCHOLOGY 276 (4th ed. 1992).
15 Davis, supra note 2.
16 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 5. Gardner's model of intellectual capacity also differs
from Binet's and Piaget's in that Gardner believes an individual's intelligences can change over the span
of his or her life, where the more traditional model envisions intellectual capacities that are strictly inbom.
GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 9. Gardner feels that "possibly genetic factors set some kind of
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or potential (where] intelligence is composed of a number of independent
faculties, each of which entails a set of skills that enable the individual to
resolve genuine problems or difficulties encountered in the world."17
II.











Gardner first speaks to the "traditional intelligences," the first of which is
logical-mathematical intelligence. Logical-mathematical intelligence, as
defined by Gardner, alludes to "the capacity to analyze problems logically,
carry out mathematical operations, and investigate issues scientifically.' 18 Its
application to the law is straightforward:
Lawyers use logical mathematical intelligence when they construct
legal or factual arguments and analyze or strategize about legal
situations. Courts and other legal institutions use logic to
legitimize and guide their exercise of authority .... Law school
pays particular attention to logical-mathematical reasoning.
Students are required to construct abstract, logical arguments in
the classroom and in their examinations. The stress law school
places on logical-mathematical reasoning is understandable for at
least two reasons. First, this is the intelligence traditionally
associated with the single intelligence view. It remains the skill or
aptitude most widely measured in traditional intelligence testing
and upon which most American educators continue to focus.
upper bound on the extent to which an intelligence may be realized or modified in the course of a human
life. As a practical matter, however, it is likely to be the case that this biological limit is rarely if ever
approached .... By the same token, no one-whatever his or her biological potential-is likely to develop an
intelligence without at least some opportunities for exploration of the materials that elicit a particular
intelligence. In sum, the surrounding culture plays a preponderant role in determining the extent to which
an individual's intellectual potential is realized." Id. at 4748.
17 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 254.
18 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 42.
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Second, whether or not it is the general intelligence of traditional
theorists, logical mathematical reasoning plays an important role in
the law . . . . [L]ogical thinking is a key aptitude every lawyer
needs."'
9
Professor Gardner states that "there is room [in the legal profession] for the
individual with highly developed logical skills: one who is able to analyze a
situation, to isolate its underlying factors, to follow a torturous chain of
reasoning to its ultimate conclusion., 20 Logical-mathematical intelligence is
at the heart of traditional legal pedagogy; our entire system of stare decisis,
which is so much the focus of law classroom discussion, is based on it.
21
The second traditionally recognized intelligence is linguistic
intelligence, which is "sensitivity to spoken and written language, the ability
to learn languages, and the capacity to use language to accomplish certain
goals.', 22 It consists of four major capacities: mastery of semantics, which is
sensitivity to meaning of words and what they imply in context; 23 mastery of
phonology, which is an appreciation of the sounds of words and their musical
interactions with one another;24 mastery of syntax, which is expertise in the
rules governing the organization of words and their inflections; 25 and mastery
of the pragmatic functions, which is superiority in the uses to which language
can be put.
26
Professor Gardner states "[1]awyers . . .are among the people with
high linguistic intelligence, 27 and discusses the importance of linguistic
intelligence to lawyering:
There is room in (and at the top of) the legal profession for the
individual who has outstanding linguistic skills: one who can
19 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 255-56.
20 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 317.
21 Weinstein, supra Note 7, at 255; see also Andrea Kayne Kaufman, The Logician Versus the
Linguist-An Empirical Tale of Functional Discrimination in the Legal Academy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 247, 251 (2002).
22 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 41.
23 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 76.
24 Id.
2 Id.
26 Id. It is important to note that linguistic intelligence can be either in oral or written form and an
individual that has talent in one does not always have equal aptitude in the other. Weinstein, supra note 7,
at 256, citing GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 95. Weinstein also reflects upon the fact that, at least
anecdotally, lawyers and law students frequently demonstrate that logical and linguistic intelligences are
clearly distinct. "Law reviews, [sic] are rife with sophisticated analysis expressed in clumsy, awkward
language and lovely, flowing prose that offers ideas that are, at base, illogical." Weinstein, supra note 7,
at 257.
27 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 41.
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excel in the writing of briefs, the phrasing of convincing
arguments, [and] the recall of facts from hundreds of cases .... 28
Intrinsic to lawyering is the expression of ideas in written and oral form.29
"A person with superior linguistic aptitude is able to choose and sequence
words to persuade and educate others, to remember and use information...
.,,30 Language is used by lawyers to "excite, stimulate, convey, and
convince."' Sensitivity to word choice is used in drafting and interpreting
legal documents.32 Last, Professor Gardner also states that "certainly
individuals are helped if they have good linguistic intelligence because so
much negotiation involves speaking and listening. 3 3 In short, lawyers use
language to educate others about the complicated legal issues we are charged
to champion.34
Gardner next identifies a "non-traditional intelligence"-
spatial/visual intelligence-"the potential to recognize and manipulate the
patterns of wide space ... as well as the patterns of more confined areas."35
"Spatial intelligence is the ability to form a mental model of a spatial world
and to be able to maneuver and operate using that model. Sailors, engineers,
surgeons, sculptors, and painters . . . all have highly developed spatial
intelligence. ,,
3 6
While its usefulness to the practice of law is perhaps less
immediately apparent than that of logical or linguistic intelligence, spatial
intelligence can also be invaluable to the practicing attorney:
A trial attorney uses this ability to create visual aids to explain
complex scientific evidence to a lay jury. The ability to discern
similarities across diverse domains involves the use of metaphor
and the ability to perceive patterns. An attorney uses metaphor to
help a jury or client understand complex information by relating it
to something the jury already knows. Likewise, an attorney must
also be able to perceive patterns. Like a master chess player, an
attorney uses visual/spatial intelligence to 'relate a perceived
28 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 317.
29 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 256; see also Abiel Wong, Note, "Boalt-ing" Opportunity?:
Deconstructing Elite Norms in Law School Admissions, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 199, 209
(1999).
30 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 256, citing GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 77-78.
31 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 253.
32 Id.
33 Howard Gardner, Using Multiple Intelligences to Improve Negotiation Theory and Practice,
16 NEG. J. 321, 321-22 (2000) [hereinafter Gardner, Negotiation].
34 Id.
35 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 42.
36 GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 9.
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pattern to past patterns, and to develop the present position into an
overall game plan.'
37
Professor Joyce Martin adds that visual intelligence can aid the lawyer in the
visualization of end products and the steps toward their achievement, thus
minimizing "dead time. 3 8 She further adds that the intelligence can aid in
witness verification, the grasping of technology, and the niche legal practice
of intellectual property. 39 Those gifted in manipulating visuals could excel in
the "seeing is believing" school of persuasion.
The next group of intelligences Gardner discusses is what he dubs
the personal intelligences; 40 the first of which is interpersonal intelligence-
"the ability to notice and make distinctions among other individuals, and, in
particular, among their moods, temperaments, motivations, and intentions."'
4
It is the "capacity to understand intentions, motivations, and desires of other
people and, consequently to work effectively with others. ' 42 Therefore, it is
a skill possessed by political and religious leaders, skilled parents and
teachers, and by other individuals enrolled in the helping professions.43
"A lawyer uses interpersonal intelligence to interact with clients,
judges, adversaries, witnesses, experts, and law enforcement. The lawyer
relies on interpersonal intelligence to be an effective counselor who
communicates, listens, and empathizes with a client. A lawyer then uses
interpersonal intelligence to negotiate, mediate, persuade and otherwise
advance her client's interests."44 An attorney who has insight into others'
emotional states is better able to collaborate with colleagues, work with or
against adversaries and persuade others. Professor Gardner himself lauded
the interpersonally gifted lawyer-"one who can speak eloquently in the
courtroom, skillfully interview witnesses and prospective jurors, and display
an engaging personality., 45 We can use interpersonal intelligence to reverse
the public's poor conceptions of lawyers by displaying "empathy, caring and
concern for the needs of others., 46 "Interpersonal intelligence is arguably the
37 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 255, citing GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 192-95.
38 Joyce Martin, Multiple Intelligences and the Practice of Law: A New Framework, at
http://www.abanet.orglpmnewsletters/articles/lnewsarticlel2305_front.shhtml (last visited July 24, 2004).
39 Id.
40 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 237.
41 Id. at 239.
42 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 43.
43 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 239.
4 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 255-56, citing GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 239, and
Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 59-61 (1992); see also Wong,
supra note 29, at 209, and Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: The Role of Education in
Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 359, 366 (1998). Howard Gardner himself has identified the importance
of interpersonal intelligence in negotiation. Gardner, Negotiation, supra note 33, at 522.
45 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 317.
4 Martin, supra note 38.
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most important skill for a lawyer whose practice setting involves client
contact, group work, or oral advocacy. ,47
The other personal intelligence is intrapersonal intelligence. This
intelligence alludes to the "capacity to understand oneself, to have an
effective working model of oneself-including comprehending one's own
desires, fears, and capacities-and to use such information effectively in
regulating one's own life' '48 through self-awareness, self-confidence, self-
discipline, and motivation. 49  At least one scholar states that "discipline,
intelligence, commitment, and motivation to succeed . . .may be more
important to success in [law] school [than a high score on the LSATs.]
50
Another concurs that "[l]awyers and law students must have the motivation,
self discipline and insight required to carry out complex, long term
projects. 51
Other commentators focus on the moralistic aspect of the
intelligence, finding that "[a] lawyer must use intrapersonal intelligence to
listen to her conscience as she has a unique responsibility to be ethical and to
exercise good judgment. 5 2  Still others embrace the significance of the
maxim, "know thyself" in asserting that, "[s]elf-knowledge can also be a
powerful tool in making predictions and interpreting the motivations and
actions of others. As we better understand ourselves, we can use that
knowledge to interpret others. 5 3 Professor Gardner tells us that this ability
to "know one's own needs and desires and modes of operation " 4 can be
invaluable in the negotiation tasks that most lawyers are called upon, at one
47 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 258.
48 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 43; see also GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 9.
49 Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law School,
52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 99 (2002). [hereinafter Hess, Heads]. See also id. at 75-80. Of course, other
scholars have legitimately pointed out that one's intrapersonal intelligence can be affected by external
factors. For instance, Cathleen A. Roach has posited that, "[tihe segregation felt by minority law students
can affect motivation which in turn affects self-esteem and the necessary sense of confidence required to
survive." Cathleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping Into The Informational Stream to Move
Students From Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 675 (1994). There is also the question of the
prevalence of mental illness, especially depression, among law students. One 1986 study put the figure of
first-year law students afflicted by depression to be at 40%. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of
Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 225, 246-47. Professor Glesner also discusses the higher than average rate of drug and
alcohol abuse among lawyers. B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CONN. L. REV.
627, 629 (1991). Professor Martin states that "conservative estimates [state] that one lawyer in six is a
problem drinker." Martin, supra note 38.
50 Wong, supra note 29, at 208.
51 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 257.
52 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 256, citing Schultz, supra note 44, at 59-61. See also Weinstein,
supra note 7, at 257, and Wong, supra note 29, at 209, citing Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria:
The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
1065, 1076-78 (1997).
53 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 257.
54 Gardner, Negotiation, supra note 33, at 322.
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time or another, to do. Additionally, a lawyer can use intrapersonal
intelligence to aid her in coping with the stresses, psychological and
otherwise, that inhere in the legal profession55 and in law school.56 Perhaps
most significant is the fact that "[tihere are many in the law who succeed
more by regular and steady effort than by brilliance. 5 7  To whatever extent
the old chestnut that "the A students end up working for the C students"
proves true, the domination is probably due to intrapersonal intelligence.
The next non-traditional intelligence identified by Gardner is
musical intelligence, "which alludes to skill in the performance, composition,
and appreciation of musical patterns,',58 specifically pitch, rhythm, and
timbre. 59  Gardner singled music intelligence out as a discrete intelligence
because it is almost parallel structurally to linguistic intelligence-Gardner
asserts it is neither scientifically nor logically sound to call the former a
talent and the latter an intelligence. 60
55 Weinstein asserts that intrapersonal intelligence is significant is aiding lawyers in avoiding
"self-defeating" behaviors. Weinstein, supra note 7, at 257.
56 See Glesner, supra note 49. Professor Glesner explains the pernicious effects of stress on law
school learning:
Stress interferes with learning in a number of ways. Stress can cause students to
worry more than they work. This distraction ... interferes with the processing of
information by reducing the ability to receive information and to store that
information in working memory.
Id. at 636. Professor Glesner cites the striking results of a study that concluded that "only one-quarter of
the variance in achievement could be accounted for by cognitive ability. That study concluded: 'In
stressful situations, therefore, non-cognitive intrapersonal variables may become predominant
determinants of learning, irrespective of actual ability levels."' Id. at 637, citing Boyle, The Role of
Intrapersonal Psychological Variables in Academic School Learning, 25 J. SCHOOL PSYCHOL. 389, 390
(1987). See also Hess, Heads, supra note 49, at 80.
57 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 257. Of course, it should be noted that, since the personal
intelligences both have many facets, not every trait associated with the intelligence might be of benefit to
lawyers or law students. William Kidder cites two studies that, while based on the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator as opposed to Howard Gardner's work, might indicate that not every interpersonal or
intrapersonal character trait might work to a law student's advantage. In one of these studies, "[lI]aw
students rated as being friendly, tactful, sympathetic, and concerned with harmonious human contacts are
four times more likely to drop out of law school than students characterized as decisive, logical, and able
to absorb and recall many facts." William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT,
Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 201 (2000), citing
Paul VanR. [sic] Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, LSAC 65-1, in
LSAC, REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH: VOLUME I: 1949-1969 302 (1976). A follow-up
indicated that "law students self-rated as preferring conspicuous originality to inconspicuous
conventionality, enthusiasm to less excitability, and mercy to justice, all had significantly higher drop-out
rates. The study's author concluded that the student ideally suited for the study of law was one 'whose
judgments are relatively uninfluenced by sympathy' and whose 'makeup is tough-minded."' Kidder,
Testocracy, at 201, citing Paul VanR. [sic] Miller, A Follow-Up Study of Personality Factors as
Predictors of Law Student Performance, LSAC 67-2, in LSAC, REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED
RESEARCH: VOLUME : 1949-1969403,411-412 (1976).
58 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 42.
59 id. See also GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 104-05.
60 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 42.
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The relationship between musical intelligence and the practice of
law, at first glance, might appear oblique, 61 but parallels can be drawn.
Certainly, musical intelligence could be useful in niche practices, such as
entertainment law. But more significantly, a certain understanding of
rhythm, cadence, pitch, and timbre could be an invaluable asset to an oral
advocate-an element frequently described as eloquence. Moreover, the use
of mnemonics, or memorizing legal materials by rote, could be facilitated by
62musical intelligence.
Next, Gardner talks of the use of the body as an instrument.
"Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence is the ability to solve problems or fashion
products using one's whole body, or parts of the body., 63 "Characteristic of
such an intelligence is the ability to use one's body in highly differentiated
and skilled ways, for expressive as well as goal-directed purposes.
64
Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence could manifest in gross motor skills, 65 fine
motor skills,66 facial expressions,67 and body language/posture.68
Kinesthetic intelligence is applicable to the acting skills that are
required of all attorneys, including how we use facial expressions, posture,
gestures, eye contact, and our voices. 69 How we position ourselves in front
of a client, a judge, a jury, or a classroom involves gross motor skills and is
crucial to how persuasive we are.70 Next time we see a charming moot court
participant enchant their judge or jury, credit their bodily-kinesthetic
intelligence.7'
After sixteen years of ruminating over his theory, Gardner decided in
1999 that the list of intelligences he had originally identified was incomplete
61 Professor Gardner himself states that the relationship of musical intelligence to the practice of
law is "less obvious." GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 318.
62 Professor Patton recounts an example of how he taught his students the element of duty in the
tort of negligence by the mnemonic "CURSE," which stands for custom, undertaking, relationship, statute,
or emergency. William Wesley Patton, Opening Students' Eyes: Visual Learning Theory in the Socratic
Classroom, 15 L & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 11 (1991). As for the power of music, I still amuse my students
annually by singing to them the preamble to the Constitution, memorized by me at the tender age of
seven, due to the musical stylings of ABC's "Schoolhouse Rock."
63 GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 9; see also GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 42.
64 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 206.
65 Id. at 206, 209. Professor Martin also raises the benefit that superior kinesthetic intelligence
can lead to greater physical fitness, an asset to any lawyer in our stressful profession. Martin, supra note
38.
66 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 206, 209.
67 See id. at 206.
68 Id.; see also Martin, supra note 38.
69 See GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 226-230.
70 Id.
7' Although it should be noted that, as with musical intelligence, Professor Gardner deemed the
relationship between bodily-kinesthetic intelligence and the practice of law to be "less obvious." Id. at
318.
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and he supplemented it in Intelligences Refrained.7 The first of these new
intelligences was natural intelligence, which alludes to "the core capacities to
recognize individuals as members of a group (specifically, a species); to
distinguish among members of a species; to recognize the existence of other,
neighboring species; and to chart out the relationships among the several
different species. 73 This intelligence has evolutionary significance, both for
predators and prey74 and is typified by such historical and public figures as
Charles Darwin, John James Audubon, and Stephen Jay Gould.75
To apply naturalistic intelligence to the law, one might accept that
the same gifts that aided our ancestors in the game of evolutionary roulette
would aid the lawyer in the modem battles that he or she faces. The
intelligence could aid the lawyer in detecting patterns,76 "making and
justifying distinctions,"" perceiving relationships,78  and making and
understanding analogies, such as classifying materials.79 Professor Martin
also touts the benefits of naturalistic intelligence in the practice of
environmental law, as well as the benefits in stress reduction we can all gain
from communing with nature.80
The next intelligence discussed in Intelligence Refrained is spiritual
intelligence,81 which refers to "concern with cosmic or existential issues" 82
and "a desire to know about experiences and cosmic entities that are not
readily apprehended in a material sense but that, nonetheless, are important
to human beings. 83 Individuals who ask and are gifted in answering the big
questions of existence and who relate handily to the supernatural world or
larger cosmos have this gift, 84 as well as the rare individuals throughout
human history who are reputed to have achieved a higher spiritual state of
being or consciousness, such as meditation or salvation.85 Included too are
72 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 34.
73 Id. at 49.
74 See id.
75 Id. at 48.
76 Id. at 50.
77 Id. at 49.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 Martin, supra note 38.
81 Gardner himself lately acknowledges that, by his own standards, this intelligence and the next,
existential intelligence, have not been as fully established; thus, Gardner has referred to his having only "8
2 intelligences." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 118 n.91, quoting Howard Gardner,
Keynote Address at the Hewlett Center Conference 2000: Focus on Negotiation Pedagogy (March 10,
2000).
82 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 54.
83 Id.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 55-56.
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those who have helped others to a spiritual experience.86 Among these
individuals, Gardner numbers Jesus, Mother Theresa, Buddha, and
Confucius .87
Certainly, few, if any of us, aspire to such lofty goals through the
pursuit of our legal avocation. However, it is not absurd to assert that being
at peace with oneself would be an asset to anyone in our profession. Equally
beneficial to attorneys is the capability of deep thought and the leadership
and charisma embodied by great spiritual leaders.88 Perhaps, most
significantly, true understanding of moral concepts that are applicable to the
law, such as justice, mercy, liberty, and truth, should be valued by our
profession.
The final intelligence described by Gardner is existential
intelligence,89 which represents "concern with ultimate issues"'9 and the
"capacity to locate oneself with respect to the furthest reaches of the cosmos
and existence."9' The existentially gifted are able to imagine and
contemplate the infinite.92  This is the cognitive side of spiritual
intelligence,93as embodied by such figures as Albert Einstein94 and Mahatma
Gandhi. 95
As with spiritual intelligence, the capability for "big picture
thinking," or for looking beyond the present imbroglio to future
ramifications, is an asset for any lawyer. The ability to grasp philosophy and
cosmology aids one in determining the proper placement and order of
individuals and concepts in the universe. Additionally, understanding chaos
theory and the ripple effect are important concepts for the lawyer to grasp in
her role as a social engineer.96 Professor Gardner himself provides a
fascinating exegesis of how existential intelligence could benefit the attorney
engaged in a negotiation:
Existential intelligence helps us to ask and answer the biggest
questions of life: Who are we? What are we trying to achieve?
What is going to become of us? Often a negotiation that seems to
be about something trivial is actually about some fundamental
issue (e.g. Am I being taken seriously?). Thus, a dollop of
86 See id. at 57-58.
87 See GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 57-58.
88 See Wong, supra note 29, at 209.





94 Id. at 62.
95 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 62.
9 Certainly, every lawyer could benefit from a superior sense of priority!
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existential intelligence can be very precious in a successful
negotiation.97
Indeed, that dollop would help the lawyer in all that she does. In addition to
the discrete intelligences recognized by Gardner, he also suggests several
higher-level cognitive operations that cut across multiple intelligences, such
as common sense, originality, capacity to make and perceive metaphors and
analogies, wisdom, and morality.98
Certainly, in its twenty-one years of existence, MI theory has been
subject to criticism. First, there are those who prefer the status quo: that
logical and linguistic intelligences should be valued above others or that the
other identified intelligences are talents and not intelligences at all.99
Gardner himself addressed a criticism that his theory was arbitrary in
limiting his theory to then seven intelligences.'0° He posed the hypothetical
question, "What prevents the ambitious theoretician from constructing a new
intelligence' for every skill found in human behavior? In that case, instead
of seven intelligences, there might be 700!
1 °01
Gardner also speaks to the art lovers, in justifying why he has
identified a musical intelligence, but not an artistic one. 1 2  Similarly, he
refuses to carve out leadership as a discrete intelligence.10 3  Perhaps the
biggest conundrum of all in Gardner's work is that Gardner's theory will
perhaps for all times remain a theory because it cannot be tested. 104  By its
97 Gardner, Negotiation, supra note 33, at 322.
98 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 286-94. Given the influx of cognitive and development
psychology into popular culture and, to a lesser extent, into interdisciplinary legal studies, various legal
scholars have suggested "intelligences" for inclusion into Gardner's scheme. For instance, Professor
Davis advocates for the inclusion of narrative, strategic and metacognitive, practical, and social
intelligences. Davis, supra note 2. I personally would plump for the inclusion of wit and humor. Of
course, Professor Gardner would likely respond that these capabilities are already subsumed under one or
more of his identified intelligences.
99 Gardner responds that he is not wedded to the term:
I would be satisfied to substitute such phrases as 'intellectual competences,'
'thought processes,' 'cognitive capacities,' 'cognitive skills,' 'forms of knowledge,'
or other cognate mentalistic terminology. What is crucial is not the label but,
rather, the conception: that individuals have a number of domains of potential
intellectual competence which they are in a position to develop, if they are normal
and if the appropriate stimulating factors are available.
GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 8, at 284.
too GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 45.
101 Id. Gardner answers the criticism by explaining the methodology he used to come up with the
distinct intelligences. See id.
102 Gardner responds that many, if not all, of his identified intelligences can be used artistically,
but that it is cultural mores that determine aesthetics. Id. at 46; see also GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra
note 7, at 108.
103 GARDNER, REFRAMED, supra note 7, at 115.
104 See id. at 80.
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very nature, Gardner's work is attacking intelligence testing and "having a
battery of MI tests is not consistent with the major tenets of the theory."' 0 5
However, despite its flaws, Gardner has served notice that his theory
is here to stay and increasingly commentators, particularly those on
education, are taking notice. For at least one, the failure of legal pedagogy to
take greater cognizance of multiple intelligences is tantamount to
discrimination. "Law school creates an artificial hierarchy of intelligences
that unfairly rewards those traditional students who think with logical
intelligence at the expense of those nontraditional students who think with
other intelligences."1°6 Gardner himself concurs that "[S]chool (including
law school) focuses particularly on linguistic and logical-mathematical
intelligences. But the other intelligences, ranging from musical to naturalist,
are important as well."'0 7 As such, Gardner warns that "when one or two
intelligences reflect the standards of competence, 'it is virtually inevitable
that most students will end up feeling incompetent. '"10 8 Given the high
stakes, it behooves us to examine whether any of those feelings of
incompetence are unnecessary and unjustified.
III.
According to noted feminist legal scholar Susan P. Sturm, legal
education, alpha to omega, is bent on the creation of just one kind of lawyer:
Legal education plays a pivotal role in socializing lawyers to the
primacy of the gladiator model. Law schools' pedagogy,
curriculum, and placement tend to be structured around this one-
size-fits-all gladiator model of lawyering. The gladiator model
channels who is accepted into law school: those predicted to be
analytically rigorous, as measured by performance on law school
entrance exams. It frames the content of the curriculum, which is
organized around an adversarial, litigation model aimed at using
tools of analytic reasoning to advance a claim and win an
argument. It structures how students are taught: in large,
hierarchical classes emphasizing quickness and performance, as
opposed to deep thinking and communication. It emerges in the
prevailing system of evaluation: issue spotting, timed exams, and
an emphasis on abstract analytical reasoning. All of these aspects
of dominant law school culture are highly individualistic in their
mode of learning, performance, and evaluation. Determining
105 Id.
106 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 262.
107 Gardner, Negotiation, supra note 33, at 321.
108 Davis, supra note 2, citing GARDNER, PRAcTICE, supra note 10, at 74.
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winners and losers defines the pattern of interaction, both
substantively and pedagogically.'9
It is time to entertain the notion that not all of our students need be warriors
in the kind of zero-sum battle Professor Sturm describes. By omega, "[a]fter
three years of battle with law school, "fighting" students often are left
dispirited about learning and cynical about the law, the legal profession, and
most especially law school."" 0
But we must begin our discussion of the battle with the alpha of
admissions. The traditional admissions model at most schools is weighted
heavily toward the index-a number derived from the student's LSAT score
combined with their undergraduate GPA. Under the current regime, the
Harvard Plan, this index score reigns supreme with "plusses" given for other
factors: such as a strong essay, impressive extracurricular activities or work
experience, minority status, and being a "legacy" or the child of an
alumnus."' The Harvard Plan is near and dear to us, not only because it is
the model we have all lived under for twenty-five years, but because, almost
by definition, everyone employed as a law professor thrived under this
system. We all got high LSAT scores, impressive grades, and the kinds of
prestigious jobs that led us into academia, where, of course, we are going to
be favorably disposed to admitting law students like us.1
12
So what's wrong with that?
Intuitively, it seems fair to focus on undergraduate grades. The
students could select their own coursework, presumably in areas that
accentuate their strengths, and the grades they earn speak as much to their
work ethic as their capabilities. 13 However, several scholars have identified
lingering concerns with the LSATs, the factor identified by several scholars
109 Sturm, supra note 6, at 128-29. Although Professor Sturm's focus was on the damage the
gladiator model does to women, she notes that it is "problematic for others who learn differently, embrace
different values, or pursue their role in different ways. The one-size-fits-all approach to teaching and
evaluation silences and undervalues those with different learning styles and visions of themselves as
lawyers." Id. at 132.
110 Glesner, supra note 49, at 628.
I See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
112 Delgado, supra note 10, at 597. See also id. at 609. We and our alumni also have a vested
interest in keeping our school's median reported LSAT score as high as possible to bolster those U.S.
News rankings. See Wong, supra note 29, at 210.
113 It should be noted, however, that several commentators have raised concerns about the
reliability of the UGPA (Undergraduate Grade Point Average) as a predictor. "UGPA carries its own set
of limitations, including the influence of factors such as leniency of grades, rigor of the curriculum
represented by the grades, and students' motivation and application." Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to
Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a
Factor In Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 31 (1997). See also Wong, supra note
29, at 210, citing Wightman, Diversity, at 15 ("[U]sing UGPA as a primary index for admission would
still result in the disproportionate exclusion of minorities, although the disparate impact would be
lessened.").
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as the one most determinative of an applicant's fate in the admissions
process. 1 14
The LSATs were inaugurated in 1948 to determine which returning
GIs would go to law school and which would not. 15 Psychometrically, it is
not unlike a traditional IQ test, and like traditional IQ test, only two
intelligences are worthy of assessment: "[S]tandardized tests such as the
LSAT measure individual ability only through the 'narrow lens' of
"linguistic and logical . . .domains." 1 6  Also, like a standard IQ test, the
LSAT is administered in a multiple-choice format which could penalize
creative or unorthodox thinking, not necessarily traits we want to discourage
in aspiring lawyers.
1 7
Perhaps even more significantly, there is controversy about the
ability of the LSATs to predict success in law school. Several law review
articles, by such esteemed scholars as Lani Guinier and Richard Delgado,
have pointed to statistical studies supporting the assertion that LSATs are not
very good at doing what they profess to do, namely predict first year
114 William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender Bias on the LSATand Its Relationship
to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 6 (2000) [hereinafter Kidder,
Portia], citing Linda F. Wightman, An Examination of Sex Differences in LSAT Scores From the
Perspective of Social Consequences, 11 APPLIED MEASUREMENT IN EDUC. 255, 272 (1998) [hereinafter
Wightman, Sex Differences]. Kidder explains well the relevance of Wightman's work:
[It finds] that for 1991 applicants to ABA schools, LSAT scores and UGPAs jointly
have a correlation coefficient with actual admit/deny decisions of .71 for both male
and female applicants ... A correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength of
association between two variables. A common statistical procedure is to square the
correlation coefficient to calculate the total amount of variation accounted for by
the relationship of these two variables. Thus, a correlation of .71 means that just
over half of all the differences in admission decisions are accounted for by a
combination of LSAT scores and UGPAs. Since LSAT scores are weighted more
heavily than UGPA (usually 60/40) in admission indices, the test is the single most
decisive factor in determining who will be admitted to law school.
Kidder, Portia, at 6 n.27.
"1 Panel Discussion, Affirmative Action and Standardized Testing, 4 TEx. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 85,
87 (1998) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
116 Wong, supra Note 29, at 208, quoting Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative
Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 976 (1996). "Particular test items aside,
many ETS tests do not test all relevant skills. The LSAT, for example, only requires verbal and reasoning
fluency, not the ability to command probability, scientific reasoning, humanistic thought, historical
thought, or knowledge of human motivation and psychology - all skills important for lawyers. Multiple
choice test taking under severe time constraints, as one critic put it, 'is a specialized kind of game which
rewards certain kinds of people and penalizes others for reasons apart from their ability to handle words
[concepts] and numbers.' Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 598, quoting ALLAN NAIRN, THE REIGN OF
ETS: THE CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP MINDS 220, 283-84 (1980).
"17 "Standardized tests punish takers who deviate from the path the designer has in mind.... It
also punishes those who think outside the box." Delgado, supra note 10, at 599.
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grades. 18  Even scholars who do not share Professor Guinier and Delgado's
dim view of the LSAT's predictive value note its limitations:
Legal academia's reliance on written exams raises questions at all
stages of the process from student selection through graduation.
Although the LSAT is a valid statistical predictor, it has serious
limitations. The test can only predict a portion of the variation in
grades. Like any statistical tool, its predictions are most powerful
for the large group. The test offers progressively less information
about smaller subgroups and is not equally valid for all subgroups.
It tends to overpredict the success of white males and underpredict
the performances of women and people of color. As with any
predictive examination, its use must be informed by a good
understanding of what it can and cannot do. The LSAT offers a
prediction about the grades a student, or group of students, will
receive in law school, particularly in the first year. One of its
virtues is that it has been, and continues to be, carefully studied
and critiqued. Those who are inclined to use it with care may do
so by accounting for its weaknesses and combining it with other
assessment methods.' 19
118 "The LSAT, for example, correlates with first year grades with a coefficient of about .4
meaning that it predicts only about sixteen percent of the variation in those grades. Other factors which
we could focus on, but do not because the test is so simple and convenient, account for the other eighty-
four percent." Id. at 600. More specifically, "[tihe LSAT's correlation coefficient with first year grades
ranges from .01 to .62, depending on the law school, with a median correlation with .41. When the LSAT
is used in conjunction with undergraduate GPA, predictive validity increases (ranging from .11 to .68),
with a median correlation coefficient of .49." Wong, supra note 29, at 208, citing LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAT/LSDAS REGISTRATION AND INFORMATION BOOK 121 (1998-1999 ed.,
1998). Counsel for the student interveners in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), asserts that "at
the University of Michigan, when you combine undergraduate grades and LSAT scores, what you get is
the ability to predict twenty-seven percent of the variation in first year grades. Try selling tires or coffee
makers with those numbers. That is a preposterously low correlation to try to base something as life-
altering as an admissions decision on." Miranda K.S. Massie, Standing on the Promise of Brown and
Building a New Civil Rights Movement: The Student Intervention in Grutter v. Bollinger, 66 ALB. L. REV.
505, 512 (2003), citing Defendant-Interveners' Appeal Brief at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 746
(6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1516) [hereinafter Grutter Brief].
See also Kidder, Testocracy, supra note 51, at 187; Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality:
Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1264 n.39 (1995); and
Sturm, supra note 116, at 971.
But see Philip D. Shelton, Admissions Tests: Not Perfect, Just the Best Measures We Have,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC, July 6, 2001 ("[T]hose who cite the 16% variance fall] to place this statistic in any
context or acknowledge that, while not perfect, no other measurement of academic talent or preparedness
for law school comes close to matching the predictive qualities of the LSAT.") According to Shelton,
who is the president and executive director of the Law School Admission Council, the [SAT is the
measure that is most predictive of law school success, much more so than UGPA. Id.
119 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 247-49, citing Lisa C. Anthony et al., Predictive Validity of the
LSAT: A National Summary of the 1995-1996 Correlation Studies, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL
LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT 97-01, LAw SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REPORT SERIES (1999); Donald E. Powers,
Predicting Law School Grades for Minority and Nonminority Students: Beyond the First-Year Average,
in LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, IV REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH (1978-1983) 261,
275 (1984); Kidder, Testocracy, supra note 51 at 167, 187, 206 (2000); Kidder, Portia, supra note 114;
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Many of these scholars assert that, as a student moves beyond the first year
of law school into the second and third years, and after graduation, the
correlation to success becomes even lower. 20 Professor Weinstein proffers a
reason why this might be so:
Although first year grades are somewhat predictive of third year
grades, the relationship is not as strong as might first be expected,
perhaps because the most successful students in the first year
already have most of the benefits of high grades and so have little
incentive to work for higher grades, while those who did less well
are still in the hunt for jobs and have a strong incentive to improve
their grades.'21
The LSATs have also been criticized as unjust and arbitrary, in that
small errors on the test can take on what is, in at least one scholar's mind, an
inflated significance:
Women's and minorities' diminished opportunities to attend ABA
law schools are all the more alarming because a two-point gender
gap on the LSAT lacks statistical significance when comparing
any two individual applicants. This lack of significance will be
illustrates by pointing out what two points means to the average
LSAT test-taker .... The median score on the LSAT is a 151.
Starting with an example of two students, suppose that Michelle
obtained a 150 on a recent LSAT and Michael scored a 152 on the
same test. In practical terms, this means that Michael answered
only two more questions correctly out of the 101 scored questions
on the test. In the high-stakes contest of law school admissions,
these two questions will place Michael at the 54th percentile of
applicants and Michelle at the 46th percentile. Because there have
been as many as 100,000 law school applicants in recent years, the
Wightman, Diversity, supra note 113, at 1; William C. Kidder, Situating Asian Pacific Americans in the
Law School Affirmative Action Debate: Empirical Facts About Themstrom's Rhetorical Acts, 7 AsIAN
L. 29 (2000).
120 Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 600. See also Wightman, supra note 113, at 30. ("The
LSAT is valid for a limited use and has a clearly defined narrow focus: it is a test of acquired reading and
verbal reasoning skills that have been shown to correlate with academic successes in the first year of law
school. When it is used for a different and/or for broader purpose, not only is the use inappropriate, but
calling on the test to do more than it was intended to do damages its validity.") Abiel Wong, in fact,
interprets Wightman's data to state that "the LSAT generally does not correlate with actual graduation
rates." Wong, supra note 29, at 208, citing Wightman, Diversity, supra note 113, at 35-36. Studies of Ivy
League legacies have found that legacies admitted with far lower test scores than their peers go on to do
just as well. Delgado, Elitism, supra Note 10, at 601, citing Prime Numbers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Sept. 15, 2000 at A12 (although certainly one might argue that life, or their parents, provide these students
with other compensatory advantages).
121 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 248 n.2.
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two additional questions that Michelle missed can rank her several
thousand places behind Michael in the national applicant pool ....
Given the possibility that adverse consequences can result from
seemingly miniscule test score differences, does Michelle's
slightly lower score signify that she possesses less academic
potential?
122
The plight of Kidder's poor Michelle has also been lamented by
Professor Weinstein and others, who have alleged an inherent race and
gender bias in the LSAT and other ETS tests. 123 Certainly, whether the test
is biased or not, the discrepancy in LSAT scores between black and white
test-takers is well documented:
For the 1997-98 academic year, 71,726 students took the Law
School Admission Test. Of these, 8,216, or 11.5 percent, were
black. The median score on the LSAT for black test takers was
142.7 .... The median white score was 153.5. Thus, on average,
black scores are about 18 percent lower than white scores.
24
122 Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 18-19. Kidder answers his own rhetorical question by
turning to the field of educational measurement and the indices of standard error of measurement,
concluding that the Standard Error of Measurement for the LSATs at a two-thirds confidence level is plus
or minus 2.6 points. If one wants 95% confidence, the range of error expands to plus or minus 5.2 points.
"Thus, it could only be concluded with ninety-five percent confidence that Michelle's true score is
between a 145 and a 155." Id. See also Wong, supra note 29, at 210.
Even the Law School Admissions Council, the administrator of the LSATs, cautions against
overreliance on small differences in LSAT scores. Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 20. "It is likely that
small differences in scores are due to measurement error rather than to meaningful differences in ability..
. Thus, a test score should be regarded as a useful but approximate measure of a test taker's abilities as
measured by the test, not as an exact determination of his or her standing." LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
COUNCIL, LSAT/ILSADAS REGISTRATION AND INFORMATION BOOK, supra note 118, at 121. However,
Wong asserts that, due to the significance of the U.S. News rankings and the fact that the publication
reports the median score for each school, an "arms-race" had ensued, Wong, supra note 29, at 210, with
all the irrationality that the Cold War entailed. Law school deans have also conceded that the rankings
war was forcing schools to turn away qualified minorities. Id., citing Roger Parloff, Who's Number One?
And Who's Number 52, 91, and 37?, AMERICAN LAWYER, Apr. 1998, at 5, 8 (featuring Dean Hasl of St.
John's University School of Law discussing the pressure to admit candidates who will bolster the school's
U.S. News rankings).
123 Weinstein, supra Note 7, at 248 n.4. It is important to note that, according to President
Shelton, UGPAs show a significance performance gap across racial and ethnic groups as well. Shelton,
supra note 118. However, William Kidder, relying on the statistics compiled by Linda Wightman,
concludes that "more than twice as many African Americans would be admitted to law school under a
UGPA model compared to an LSAT/UGPA model." Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 9, citing
Wightman, Diversity, supra note 113, at 18. Puerto Ricans and other minorities are also adversely
affected by these criteria. Id. Women of color are hardest hit of all. Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 36-
37. Conversely, of course, whites are the only group advantaged by the present model. Id.
12 The Law School Admission Council, A Hundred-Million-Dollar Investment Fund that Does
Law School Testing on the Side, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Spring 2000 [hereinafter, Hundred-Million-
Dollar]. The Journal asserts that, in light of these facts, a move to a race-blind admission system "will
surely have the effect of resegregating blacks into lower-ranked law schools." Id. Consider its point that
in 1997-98, only twenty black students in the country scored a 170 or above on the LSAT, putting them in
range of the 171 that is the median reported LSAT score for Yale Law School. Id. Consider also that
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At best, assuming arguendo, that the score discrepancy is not due to any
discriminatory aspect of the test, several studies have questioned the
effectiveness of the LSAT and its cousin, the SAT, as an indicator for the
success of black students. For instance, recent studies by Derek Bok, former
president of Harvard University; his colleague William G. Bowen; and four
professors of University of Michigan law school indicate that minorities
admitted to college with SAT scores lower than those of their classmates go
on, as a group, to perform well after graduation as measured by such indices
as high activity in civic affairs, 12 5 publishing books, winning prizes, and
earning Ph.Ds at rates exceeding those of their higher testing peers.
126
Anecdotally, an article by Richard Delgado noted an interesting example of a
standardized test failure, Martin Luther King, who could not get into
graduate school because he "flunked" the GRE and enrolled instead in
theological school.
127
However, at worst, many scholars have asserted that there is
discrimination at play on the test. For instance, LSAT scores, like all
standardized test scores, are highly correlated with socioeconomic status.
28
"An SAT taker can expect an extra thirty points for every ten thousand
"even the poorest White LSAT takers score higher on the LSAT than the wealthiest Black LSAT taker."
Massie, supra note 118, at 524, Grutter Brief, supra note 118, at 6.
125 Wong, supra note 29, at 209, citing Ethan Bronner, Study Strongly Supports Affirmative Action
in Admissions to Elite Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at B 10 (reviewing the Bowen & Bok study).
126 Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 601, citing WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE
OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS (1998), and Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The
River Runs Through Law School, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 395, 398-400 (2000). Another study of
University of Michigan Law School alumni found that LSAT scores and UGPAs did not have a
relationship to measures of success for practicing lawyers, such as income or career satisfaction. David L.
Chambers et al., Doing Well & Doing Good: The Careers of Minority and White Graduates of the
University of Michigan Law School, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 60, 70 (Summer 1999). Abiel Wong states
that the LSAT has "little or no correlation with respect to the important long-term goal of admitting
persons who will competently serve the community." Wong, supra note 29, at 208, citing Eulius Simien,
The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost Twenty Years of Affirmative Action, 12 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 384 (1991) (pointing out that Defunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), contains
an admission from Rutgers University that the [SAT "has not been validated as a criterion reasonably
related to legal job performance.").
127 Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 608, citing lridder Testocracy supra note 5 1, at 192 n. 116.
128 Delgado, supra note 10, at 601, citing Nairn, supra note 116, at 197-219; Peter Sacks dubs
this the "Volvo Effect." PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS: THE HIGH PRICE OF AMERICA'S TESTING
CULTURE AND WHAT WE CAN Do TO CHANGE IT 8 (1999); Sturm, supra note 116, at 957; Wong, supra
note 29, at 209, 231-34; citing Wightman, Diversity, supra note at 4. See also CROUSE, supra note 10, at
124. Consider also the interesting statistic cited by Professor Daria Roithmayr that 50% of law students
have at least one lawyer parent and the potentially staggering advantage that that half of the class could
have. Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV.
727, 784-85 (2000).
22 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J. [Vol. 11:1
dollars of parental income. '1 29 Among other reasons, part of this discrepancy
might be due to the access of affluent students to standardized test crash/prep
courses, some of which cost more than $1200, which have documented
success in raising student standardized test scores.
30
129 SACKS, supra note 128, at 8, 27. Professor Delgado asserts, in a 1998 speech to the University
of Alabama Law School, that "zip codes predict LSAT scores better than those scores predict law school
grades." Richard Delgado, Hugo L Black Lecture: Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Action: How
Valid?, 50 Ala. L Rev. 135, 140 (1998) [hereinafter Delgado, Affirmative Action]. Part of the irony in this
phenomenon is that one of the original reasons the [SAT was embraced in the law school admissions
process:
[W]as increasing societal dissatisfaction with the elite, exclusionary selection
processes of the time. As American society became increasingly racially and
socioeconomically diverse, the elite, white students in the law school stood out in
stark and disturbing contrast. To address such concerns, law schools utilized the
LSAT as a device for extending opportunities to students from lesser-known
institutions (provided that they scored respectably on the test), thus supplementing
their practice of selecting students from the 'known,' elite institutions .... In fact,
Thurgood Marshall himself relied on standardized testing to undermine the
segregationist assertion that black children were so behind white children that it
would be senseless for them to be educated together - he remarked that students
should be judged by their test scores, rather than by the color of their skin."
Wong, supra note 29, at 208, citing Adrian Wooldridge, In Defense of the SAT, NEW REPUBLIC, June 15,
1998, at 21. Of course, it seems likely that the detractors of the LSAT would retort that it is natural that
the new leading index for admission would be coopted by the majority.
130 Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 602, citing Wong, supra note 29, at 236-37; Sex and Race
Differences on Standardized Tests: Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. On the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1987) [hereinafter, Subcomm. Hearing]; Sturm,
supra note 116, at 991 n.164; Hundred-Million-Dollar, supra note 124, at 96.
Professor Delgado further asserts, "[t]he SAT is eminently coachable. The director of one of the
prominent test-coaching companies, which charges nearly $1000 for its services, boasted that his
organization was able to boost the score of the average test taker by 185 points [on the SAT]. Thirty
percent improved by 250 or more. Because of the high price charged, the children of the wealthy
naturally are more likely to be able to take the course." Delgado, Affirmative Action, supra note 129, at
144.
An article in the Wall Street Journal cited a test prep course claiming it could raise [SAT scores by
six or seven points. Frances A. McMorris, Test-Prep Fees Deter Black Law Applicants, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 23, 1998, at B 1. The same article quotes the director of Kaplan Educational Centers as saying that
"someone who went to prep school in the Northeast and is at Brown has been trained to rely on
educational resources. But someone from a public high school may not know about these resources." Id.
Finally, the article notes that both Kaplan and Princeton Review offer scholarships to needy minority
students.
Abiel Wong asserts that the LSAT was "substantially revised" in 1989 because the test was
"embarrassingly coachable." Wong, supra note 29, at 210, citing H. Eric Semler, Law School Admission
Exam is Revised, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1989, at B5 (quoting the president of the Princeton Review, with
input from Linda Wightman). Wong asserts that the existence of an advantage in the coached students is
intuitively logical, due to, at a minimum, the familiarity with the test format the courses provide. Id. A
law school aspirant might spend fifteen minutes of precious test time just reading the instructions. Id. It
is also intuitive that, as the old adage goes, that the practice provided by the courses makes perfect. See
id. In the end, the test may, at least in part, be measuring differences in innate "test-taking skills," rather
than aptitude for law school. Id.
Of course, one might respond to Wong that test-taking is an aptitude necessary to being a lawyer.
Certainly, passing the bar exam is. In the alternate, the notion itself that the LSATs are coachable is
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Another reason why minorities in particular might have difficulty on
the LSAT is that the test content itself might be discriminatory, where many
of the test questions "presuppose knowledge that is only common in middle
or upper class white communities."'131  The ETS test creators, although
trained, are not immune from cultural and socioeconomic influences:
Test writers do not write test questions as culturally and socio-
economically stripped, neutral beings. Rather, test writers, like all
humans, reflect the culture and surroundings in which they were
raised. The situations and circumstances they incorporate into test
questions, and, more importantly, the meanings and though
patterns they deem 'right' will inevitably favor test takers who
share those meanings and thought patterns. 1
32
One examination of the SATs of the not-too-distant past found questions
requiring knowledge of golf, tennis, pirouettes, property taxes, minuets,
kettle drums, tympani, polo, and horseback riding, subjects not necessarily
common knowledge in many minority communities. 33 Another study of the
LSAT showed reading passages disparaging W.E.B. Du Bois, Cesar Chavez,
and Harriet Tubman.134  The effect of such items might extend beyond the
"hotly contested." Wong, supra note 29, at 209 n.157. The LSAC actually issued a rebuttal to the Wall
Street Journal article, questioning the survey data on which the article relies and stating that its own study
has found a much smaller discrepancy between users of test-prep services and non-users. Id., citing John
Gulino, Jr., LSAT Testing Group Rebuts Report of Test Prep Bias, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 1998,
at 7. See also Carolyn Mooney, Test Preparation Courses Have a Negligible Effect on Scores, Study
Concludes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 26, 2001,
http://chronicle.com./daily/2001/03/2001032601n.htm.
My own experience with ETS testing persuades me that the test results are coachable and otherwise
subject to the vagaries of the circumstances under which one takes the test. My first foray into ETS
testing was with the PSAT, which ETS holds out as an accurate predictor of one's future performance on
the SAT. My respectable, but not stellar, score shattered any pretensions to grandeur I may have
entertained at the time. Some years later, I took the SATs. The day of my father's wedding, attired in a
cotton candy pink satin Jessica McClintock dress, I improved my PSAT score by close to 100 points.
Five months later, comfortably swaddled in sweats and having spent weeks pouring over the Princeton
Review book, I sat for the SATs again and improved my first SAT score by 130 points. Five years later
again, when it was time to face the LSATs, I was fortunate enough to have had a generous aunt, who gave
me the Kaplan review course as a college graduation present. The course was invaluable in unfogging the
mysteries of the logic games section of the examination, which had hithertofore been the bane of my
existence. I am firmly convinced that, without the course, I never would have attained an LSAT score
sufficient to gain admission to my law school alma mater. Not every applicant to Columbia Law School
is as fortunate in their aunts.
131 Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 605; see also Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 25.
132 Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 605-06.
133 Id. at 605, citing Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 130, at 298; see also Kidder, Portia, supra
note 114, at 38-42.
134 Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 38-42. Kidder as well lists numerous examples of LSAT
questions that could be viewed as biased or offensive, including one test item regarding "Joan [who]
would like to meet anyone with money," Id. at 38, and items portraying Asian Americans as hard-
working, which might contribute to the "model minority myth." Id. at 38-39. See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW
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single question involved. "[Olne can imagine that offensive items or items
entirely foreign to an examinee's experience could harm motivation and
attention on later test questions." 135
Sociologist Claude Steele of Stanford University posited yet another
troubling phenomenon, which he labeled "stereotype threat"-an "inhibiting
anxiety." Dr. Steele found that white students outperformed equally
qualified African-American students when told that a test was a measure of
verbal ability but not when told that the test was unrelated to ability. It also
occurred when the test applicant was asked to provide background
information, including race, before commencing the test.' 36 There is at least
evidence of a gender discrepancy as well on the LSATs. William Kidder
reported that "women trail men on the LSAT by an average of approximately
one-tenth of a standard deviation."' 137  Perhaps stereotype threat is also at
play here; Claude Steele found that, on a difficult math test, men
outperformed women, except for the session where test-takers were told that
men and women performed equally well on the test. 138 If not conclusive, the
data emerging regarding the impact of the supremacy of the LSATs on
women and minorities is troubling. 39 One scholar goes so far as to caution
law schools against overreliance on the LSATs in admissions decisions,
(2003). Still another item assigns the name "Maria" to a fictional woman described as "poor" and
"uneducated." Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 39. See also Panel Discussion, supra note 115, at 90.
135 Kidder, Portia, supra note 114, at 35, citing Lorrie A. Shepard, Definitions of Bias, in
HANDBOOK OF METHODS FOR DETECTING TEST BIAS 9, 22 (Ronald A. Berk ed. 1982).
On a related matter, consider that a portion of every LSAT administered contains an "experimental"
section, where ETS is trying out questions for use in future LSAT administrations. The student is
unaware which section is the ungraded section and, while his or her performance on that section is not
computed in the student's reported score for the examination, it is more than conceivable that a poor
performance on that section, for example, if the student who perpetually struggles with Logical Reasoning
is presented with additional section of it, could pull down the grade for the entire examination.
136 Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance
of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995); see also Sandra R. Farber &
Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and Over-Confident Men: Gender and Sense of
Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 271, 279 (1999), citing Claude M.
Steele & Joshua Aronson, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613 (1997) [hereinafter Steele & Aronson, Air]. Texas State Senator
Rodney Ellis lent credence to Steele's findings with a heartrending remark reflecting on his experience of
being denied admission at the University of Texas Law School: "For some reason I didn't score well on
tests. Maybe I was just nervous. There's a lot of pressure on you, knowing that if you fail, you fail your
race." Panel Discussion, supra note 115, at 82.
137 Kidder, Portia, supra note 116, at 6, citing Wightman, Sex Differences, supra note at 256.
Kidder reports that since 1991, the gender gap has only spread, increasing to two-tenths of a standard
deviation in 1995-96. Id. However, it is important to note that Wightman's own study concluded that the
LSAT does not cause gender bias and that indeed there is a paucity of reliable studies to demonstrate such
bias. Id. at 7-8, citing Wightman, Sex Differences, supra note 114, at 257.
138 Farber & Rickenberg, supra note 136, at 279, citing Steele, Air, supra note 116, at 620.
139 Another significant issue regarding the use of LSAT scores by law schools is that many law
schools use LSAT scores as the principal criterion for allocating merit based scholarship money, money
that can significantly impact on a student's ability to matriculate at a particular school. Kidder, Portia,
supra note 116, at 23, citing LSAC, Law School Links, http:I/www. lsac.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2000).
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intimating that such a move would be tantamount to actionable disparate
impact discrimination.140
Recent Supreme Court decisions at least suggest that that august
body holds a complex view regarding discrimination in law school
admissions, and the need for redress thereof. Now we in academe must
scramble to adapt to its edicts, and to some extent, anticipate those of the
future. The decision of the Court in Gratz v. Bollinger,141 which struck down
the use of a point system as a means of taking cognizance of racial diversity,
is reality for us. And, even though in its law school companion case, Grutter
v. Bollinger,142 the Court upheld an admissions model that made minority
status a plus, in light of a compelling interest in attaining a "critical mass" of
minorities, the Court signaled that it might not always continue to
countenance such a form of affirmative action. Justice O'Connor indicated
in dicta in Grutter that the remedy permitted there was necessarily time-
limited and that the Court expected twenty-five years from now that race
consciousness in admissions should no longer be necessary. 1
43
That gives us twenty-five years or perhaps less 44 to cast about for
new lawful ways to create a diverse student body. In light of the fact that
there is some indication that different cultural groups in society might have
pronounced strengths in different intelligences,' 45 MI theory could offer a
valid index for promoting diversity. After all, "Surrounding [individual
students] with students of different backgrounds who may have different
kinds of intelligences enables them to grow and develop so that they can
overcome their erroneous misconceptions and acquire the depth they will
140 Kidder, Portia, supra note 116, at 21; see also Wong, supra note 29, at 208. But see
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
141 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
142 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
143 Id. at 343.
I" The future may now be here, particularly in light of the new "race blind" admission standards
now mandated by law in such states as Texas and California. Kidder, Portia, supra note 116, at 36-37.
145 It should be noted that Gardner himself deemed the examination of multiple intelligences
across racial, ethnic, and gender boundaries to be "a potentially explosive question," GARDNER,
PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 47, and he has declined to undertake such an examination, first, because he
does not believe a scientifically sound psychometric instrument exists to make such a measure and,
second, that even if one did, "[i]n the still recent past, apparent group differences on psychological
instruments have been exploited for politically dubious ends." Id. He further states that, "should any
investigator demonstrate differences among groups, I would regard those differences as the starting point
for remediation efforts, rather than as any kind of proof of inherent limitations within a group." Id.
Furthermore, it is crucial to note that several studies have found, as Wong states, "that there is no proxy
for race, and that unless race is taken into account, minorities will be underrepresented in law school
admissions." Wong, supra note 29, at 201 n.16. For instance, Professor Wightman analyzed the efficacy
of socioeconomic status, selectivity of undergraduate school, and undergraduate major, as proxies for race
and found that none of them are good surrogates. Id., citing Wightman, Diversity, supra note 113, at 52-
53.
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need to be effective attorneys who can use other intelligences besides logical
intelligence."1
46
In light of the fact that there is already "intellectual movement to
understand and explain the fundamental value of diversity and pluralism in
our society,"'147 MI theory could provide part of the framework for an
alternate admissions scheme. Increased weight could be given to such
factors as "community service, overcoming adversity, recommendation
letters, personal interviews, and unusual life experiences,"' 148 which are
factors that are more likely to be reflective of student talents in areas other
than logic and language. Gardner suggests that portfolios of projects
completed by the applicant could be a principal part of a student dossier.
4 9
To assuage concerns that adopting such an admissions practice would admit
law students who would be unable to pass the bar, Professor Linda
Wightman's exhaustive 1998 study on bar passage concluded that "these data
provide positive support both for admission practices that look beyond LSAT
and UGPA to define merit, and for a legal education system that adequately
services students whose needs and preparations vary." 50
Evaluation of multiple intelligences can provide a new, unarbitrary
rubric for creating a talented and diverse entering class. Such a policy may
also have the effect of reversing what Wong terms the "perverse" effect of
U.S. News rankings compelling law schools to "accept students with high
LSAT scores, even though their other qualifications may be disturbingly
lacking." 5 ' It could be the new frontier of affirmative action in law school
admissions. However, traversing such a frontier would require us in legal
education to alter our very definition of what talent is:
Consider... how contingent ideas of merit are. LSAT scores do
predict law school first-year grades. But they also reflect the
backgrounds and training and advantages of those who thrive
under them, as well as correspond to the law firm jobs and
prestigious clerkships come of the students will hold after they
graduate. Identifying the LSAT as a predictor of grades, or even
146 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 263-64.
W Weinstein, supra note 7, at 283.
148 Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 612; see also Wong, supra note 29, at 210 (supporting
"commitment to social justice" as a criterion for admission), and Sturm, supra note 6, at 145 (advocating
that law schools give "greater weight to experience in other settings prior to coming to law school" and
indicating that our professional counterparts, business schools, already do so).
149 GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 184.
150 Linda F. Wightman, LSAC National Longitudinal Bar Passage Study 1, 80 (LSAC Research
Report, 1998) [hereinafter Wightman, Bar Passage] (Although the study also concludes that "law school
grades and LSAT scores are strong predictors of bar examination outcomes," she concludes that, although
there are risks associated with admitting applicants with below average LSATs and UGPAs, such
applicants can "enter and succeed in the profession.")
151 Wong, supra note 29, at 212.
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of later job performance, tells us only that this narrow test picks
people who thrive in particular types of environment-the ones
that rely on the test to do their selection for them. Yet those
situations are contingent, not necessary. Change the rules, and any
test becomes more, or less, valid. Raise or lower the hoop in a
basketball game six inches, and you radically change the definition
of who has merit .... Change the legal curriculum, or the way
law is practiced, so that it becomes more cooperative or
empathetic, and half the current first-year class might not get in.
The current arrangement rewards people like us and so seems
natural and right; the idea that a school might let in a few students
with lower test scores seems radical and dangerous .... 52
IV.
Scholars like Professor Richard Delgado advocate a change in the
legal curriculum as another necessary part of the drive toward inclusivity for
racial minorities and women. But such a change might service those and
other students gifted with multiple intelligences as well.
A change would almost certainly have to entail a reevaluation of the
Socratic Method. "Langdell's Socratic Case Method 153 is the predominant
teaching methodology used in law schools today for doctrinal courses."
154
This method "require[s] students to learn by reading appellate
decisions, answering questions about the holding and reasoning of those
appellate decisions, and applying the rules of those appellate decisions to
new fact patterns,"' 55 and it can be quite successful in engaging linguistic,
but especially logical,15 6 intelligences.
However, some possible drawbacks to the Socratic Method have
been raised. For instance, women tend not to perform as well as men, due to
its emphasis on logical intelligence, which, according to a 2002 study by
Professor Andrea Kayne Kaufman is more strongly self-identified by men, as
opposed to linguistic intelligence, which is more strongly self-identified by
women.157 Some studies have found that women can be intimidated by the
152 Delgado, Affirmative Action, supra note 129, at 144-45.
153 Otherwise known as the "Harvard Method."
154 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 252. See also Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The
Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 351, 351 (1998).
155 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 252.
156 Id. at 251.
157 Id. at 257. Other scholars have also suggested that African-Americans suffer under the
Socratic Method. See Stephen R. Ripps, A Curriculum Course Designed for Lowering the Attrition Rate
for the Disadvantaged Law Student, 29 HOw. L.J. 457, 467 (1986). Some studies suggest that African-
Americans may thrive in situations that support group learning, such as simulations. See Weinstein, supra
note 7, at 282 n.100. Learning styles, or learning theory, is a subject related to multiple intelligences and
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Socratic Method. 158  Although probably springing from professors' desire to
"toughen up" students and prepare them for the rigors of legal practice,
"tough law" as one commentator has deemed it, 159 there is ample evidence
that the Socratic Method has "unquestionably left numerous students in
tremendous distress."' 6  "Certainly, when abused, the method can have
devastating effects."' 6'r  Finally, the Socratic Method is heavily dependent on
a lecture style of teaching, which in turn requires a listening form of learning
from the students, and "[w]hile most students have had extensive experience
with aural learning, it usually is not the dominant mode for absorbing
information." 62 In fact, as one commentator cleverly pointed out, for all but
the one person in the class actually being questioned, the Socratic Method is
an exercise in listening, 163 resulting in, at best, "vicarious participation."64
is also highly illustrative as a means of improving student learning. Gardner himself has spoken to
relationship between the theories. See GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 44. Although too
voluminous a subject to be covered in more than a cursory manner in the present article, there has been
much fascinating work done on the subject of learning styles or theories. For instance, Professor Jacobson
has speculated that the appearance in African American students of primary learning styles which are oral
and relational in greater frequency than in the general population may "have roots in West African
culture." M.H. Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 139, 154 n.60 (2001). But see Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of
Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 484 (1996):
Critics have charged that the Langdellian method has an especially harsh effect on
minority, women, and other non-traditional law students. Although it is true that
the Langdellian method derives its origins from white men, it is not true that only
white men master the technique. Moreover, it is racist and sexist to suggest that
people other than "white men" cannot master the art of intellectual dialogue.
158 Professor Kaufman speaks of the "muting" of female and other "outsider" voices in law school.
Kaufman, supra note 21, at 267, citing Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing
Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 17-20
(1998). She cites anecdotes garnered from several colleagues: "One colleague told me that her criminal
law professor silenced her when she said she felt 'uncomfortable talking about rape as a sex crime.'
Another colleague told me the professor rolled his eyes when she spoke of her personal experiences as an
adoptee. A third colleague told me she never participated in class after being reprimanded by a professor
because she requested that he refer to the female students as 'women' rather than 'gals."' Kaufman, supra
note 21, at 267; see also James Eagar, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical
Methods in Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 389,402 (1997).
159 Glesner, supra note 49, at 644.
160 Roach, supra note 49, at 670; see also Hess, supra note 49, at 92.
161 Stropus, supra note 157, at 457.
162 Jacobson, supra note 157, 155 n.61. In discussing this matter, Professor Munro too cites an
apt ancient Chinese proverb, "I hear, and I forget; I see, and I remember; I do, and I understand."
GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 70 (2000).
163 Eagar, supra note 158, at 401, citing Peter B. Maggs & Thomas D. Morgan, Computer-Based
Legal Education at the University of Illinois: A Report of Two Years' Experience, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC.
138, 140 (1975).
164 Id., citing Frank R. Strong, The Pedagogic Training of a Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 226,
235 (1973).
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The Socratic Method is an important and often effective teaching
device. 165  Additionally, for the experienced law professor, conducting a
class in the Socratic format might be the least labor intensive method of
teaching 66 and certainly law professors' scant time should be valued at a
premium. The method should not be jettisoned entirely. "The 'study of
litigated disputes not only teaches the rules of law, but provides the
reasoning to show how and why the cases were won." 167 But not only does
its exclusive use jeopardize cognizance of multiple intelligences and raise
concerns for the psychological well-being of students, at least one scholar
asserts, "[I]t does not teach law students to think like lawyers; it teaches them
to think like judges-with all the constraints that role implies. '' 168 In light of
the foregoing concerns increasingly raised in the legal academy, it should not
be relied upon exclusively as the means of educating law students. 169
In addition to teaching, most law schools emphasize logical
intelligence in the evaluation of students as well. Many first-year
courses evaluate students using standard bluebook examinations.
These times tests require students to 'issue spot' and apply the
holdings of appellate decisions from their case books to a complex
set of facts and to use the logic of precedential reasoning to predict
possible legal outcomes. 1
70
The dominant method of law teaching is the case method; the
prevailing method of evaluating students is a comprehensive final
165 Professor Hess interviewed several students regarding their views of the Socratic Method and
concluded that it can work if we the law professors play nice:
I think there is a place for the Socratic method. It's a question of whether it's
applied with some humanity and whether you allow the student to maintain some
dignity .... If this professor is a nice person and treats people well, I'm going to
work extra hard in that class just because I have that kind of relationship with that
person not only in class but outside of class.
Hess, supra note 49, at 92.
66 Patton, supra note 62, at 1.
167 Kerper, supra note 154, at 370-7 1.
168 Id. at 371. ("This is not a bad thing. In order to be competent advisors, lawyers must
understand how judges think. But they also need to understand that, as lawyers, their available options are
greater, and therefore their own thought processes can be much broader. They will be much more
effective in representing their clients if they think more as creative problem solvers, and less like the
ultimate decision maker.").
169 "It is time for law school teaching to relegate the case method to its appropriate position-as
only one analytical tool among many which can be employed in the resolution of a client's problem." Id.
at 352; see also Eagar, supra note 158, at 403.
170 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 252-53.
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examination .... What interests me is that, almost without
exception, legal education = case method + final exam.'
17
Like the Socratic Method, traditional law school testing is very
effective in evaluating certain intelligences, such as logical. 172  However,
several possible drawbacks to bluebook examination have been identified.
First, the grades in many courses hinge on a single examination, which takes
on a disproportionate significance, according to some critics. 17 3 That single
examination could be have been created, administered, or graded on what
might be a "bad day," for either the student or the professor. 174  Moreover,
the bluebook examination provides a more restrictive format than some
alternate forms of evaluation. Bluebook examinations can be lacking in
context and are disconnected from the method of learning the students have
been exposed to all semester. 175 Professors often "teach by the case method
and actually test by the problem method."'176  Moreover, students receive
171 John M. Burman, Out-of-Class Assignments as a Method of Teaching and Evaluating Law
Students, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 447,448 (1992).
172 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 252-53.
173 "[Tihe present system is guaranteed to create artificial categories and classes of students,
which, in turn, stigmatize and dramatically affect their lives." Janet Motley, A Foolish Consistency: The
Law School Exam, 10 NOVA L. REV. 723, 724 (1986). See also MUNRO, supra note 173, at 34. Law
professor commentators have also noted, at least anecdotally, that they are "consistently surprised at the
unpredictability of student performance [on Blue Book examinations]. Students whom we expected to do
well did poorly, and some silent, barely known soul usually receives one of the highest grades in the
class." Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 881 (1985).
174 See Greg Sergienko, New Modes of Assessment, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 463, 470 (2001). Of
course, the pernicious effects of this eventuality could be ameliorated if we legal educators agreed that
part of what we are assessing is the ability of budding lawyers to perform in spite of the bad day.
However, I believe there is, by no means, such a consensus. See Burman, supra note 171, at 450 (raising
the argument that "a student who cannot perform well under the stress of taking an exam will not be able
to perform well under the stress of practicing law," but debunking it with an anecdote of a student who
performed poorly on his exams, but was very successful in a student clinic acting as lead counsel at a
hearing on a child custody issue).
175 See Roach, supra note 49, at 673. Howard Gardner himself has urged the promotion of
"assessment" over "testing" for reasons relating to this. While acknowledging that assessment is
necessary in an educational context, he states, "[w]hat distinguishes assessment from testing is the
former's favoring of techniques that elicit information in the course of ordinary performance and its
general uneasiness with the use of formal instruments administered in a neutral, decontextualized setting."
GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 174.
176 Myron Moskowitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 241, 260 (1992). Professor Moskowitz likens the situation to the following: "Your teenage son
has just signed up for a tennis class at high school. 'The class seems kind of weird,' he says. 'The teacher
told us that we will spend every class watching videotapes of tennis players playing matches, and he will
lead us in a discussion of what they are doing right and wrong, and what the rules of tennis are. But we
won't actually play any tennis ourselves until the final exam. Then our entire grade will depend on how
we play during that exam. Does that make any sense to you?"' Id. at 259. The most pessimistic view of
this phenomenon might bring to mind the pedagogy of Dolores Umbridge, the villain of the latest Harry
Potter book, who, in forbidding the practice of countercurses in Defense Against the Dark Arts class,
proclaims, "As long as you have studied the theory hard enough, there is no reason why you should not be
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little, if any, feedback after their performance. 177 Still other scholars have
lamented that the bluebook examination squelches creativity in law students,
which is an important asset these students will need as lawyers. 1
78
Other scholars have raised concerns that law school examinations
have little predictive value for eventual success in actual lawyering tasks.
Professor Weinstein notes, "[T]here is very little data supporting or
analyzing the presumed predictive relationship between law school exam
performance and lawyering. The studies that have been done are at best
equivocal, and some show no correlation between success in law school as
measured by grades and success in the profession."' 179  Certainly, at least
anecdotally, we all know of successful lawyers who were law school
mediocrities, as well as law school prodigies who did not excel in the
profession. 80  Finally, Professor Kaufman notes that bluebook examination
does not adequately assess multiple intelligences, which "are integral to the
varied and multifaceted roles of lawyering."'18 1 "The law school examination
system, with its focus on issue spotting and quickness, devalues other aspects
of successful performance that may be as or more important to successful
performance as a lawyer."'
82
In the final analysis, just as we tend to admit law students who were
just like we were, so too do we evaluate them in the way we were evaluated.
We all got high grades in law school on bluebook examinations 183 and now
we "reward [students] who [think] like law professors."' 84  Perhaps we
should not hold ourselves out as the exclusive paradigm for "how to think
able to perform the spells under carefully controlled examination conditions." J.K. ROWLING, HARRY
POT-ER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX 244 (2003).
177 See Roach, supra note 49, at 673; see also Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42
VAND. L. REV. 433, 438 (1989).
1 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 252-53.
179 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 249, citing James R.P. Ogloff et al., More than 'Learning To Think
Like A Lawyer:' The Empirical Research On Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 73, 203-20 (2000);
Ogloff, at 395; and Kidder, Testocracy, supra note 57, at 197-98. Of course, Weinstein also notes that
"[aissessing success in the profession is problematic for many reasons, including the difficulties inherent
in defining success so that it can be measured." Weinstein, supra note 7, at 249 n.9. Kidder concurs that
"it is far from established that law school grades are an acceptable measure of performance in the legal
profession." Kidder, Testocracy, supra note 57, at 198. He cites a thirty-year retrospective study by a
major New York City law firm that found that, beyond the top 1% of law school graduates, there was little
correlation between law school grades and likelihood of ascending to partner. Id. at 198, citing Sturm &
Guinier, supra note 116, at 991 n.167 (1996) (describing the study done by Fried, Frank, Shriver &
Jacobson). But see Wightman, Bar Passage, supra note 150, at 79 (1998) (finding a "significant
relationship between LGPA and bar examination outcome," although stating that high GPAs do not cause
bar exam passage).
ISO See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 249-50.
181 Kaufman, supra note 21, at 253.
182 Sturm, supra note 6, at 131.
183 See Kissam, supra note 177, at 462.
194 Burman, supra note 171, at 448.
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like a lawyer." 8 5 Law professors are but a narrow, and one might argue, not
very representative, segment of the overall lawyering population.
[Liet us consider the metaphor of community and the ethics of our
responsibilities to different communities. The law professor,
intentionally or not, assumes responsibilities to one or more of
several personal or professional communities. These communities
include our students; sectors of the legal profession such as
corporate firms, small general practices, or the criminal defense
bar; the law school or university; and broader social groups as well
... . [A]nalysis of Blue Book exams suggests that there is a
serious and inappropriate imbalance in professorial service to these
various communities, and that this imbalance has been constructed
by our unthinking adherence to a conservative examination
system. The present Blue Book system serves mainly corporate
law firms and their clients, and it may serve these interests in less
than optimal fashion. Perhaps we can change this system if we try
to think more as teachers than scholars and attend to our proximate
community-the community of all students, their interests, and the
varied social groups to which our students, their interests, and the
varied social groups to which our students and our profession can
and must relate. 1
86
To make our pedagogy more representative, our current techniques
should be supplemented 8 7 in the hopes of reaching and rewarding law
students gifted with non-traditional intelligences. There should be
movement away from legal education as a spectator sport, where students are
relegated to the role of onlooker, while the instructor performs before the
class. 88 Under such a model, the more students are actively engaged in the
learning process, the better they retain the knowledge.' 89 "Law teachers will
185 Indeed, we must avoid thinking ourselves and teaching our students that there is but one
unique way to "think like a lawyer." See Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like A
Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 121 (1994).
186 Kissam, supra note 177, at 504.
187 See Burman, supra note 171, at 453 (concluding that his students performed better on final
examinations when they were supplemented with other forms of assessment throughout the semester due
to the fact that the students had learned the material better and the exam was not as pressure packed.)
188 F. L. Dembowski, The Use of the Rigor/Relevance Framework in the Training of School
Administrators, THE AASA PROFESSOR 23, 23 (1999); see also MUNRO, supra note 173, at 70.
189 "By actually experiencing something, one learns it better than she would if simply told about
it." William Shepard McAninch, Experiential Learning in a Traditional Classroom, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
420, 420 (1986); see also Eagar, supra note 158, at 403; June Cicero, Piercing the Socratic Veil: Adding
an Active Learning Alternative in Legal Education, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1011, 1017-19 (1989),
and Robert Charles Clark, The Rationale for Computer-Aided Instruction, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 459, 460
(1983). But see Michael L. Richmond, Teaching Law to Passive Learners: The Contemporary Dilemma
of Legal Education, 26 CUMR. L. REV. 943, 954 (critiquing Clark's sources and concluding that passive
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become facilitators, and students will become initiators of their learning."' 90
The legal instructor could create and evaluate activities structured around
Gardner's Multiple Intelligences and while an instructor may not know the
intelligences of each of his or her students, he or she could provide varied
assignments that cut across different intelligences' 9' and invoke stimulating,
real-world experiences.
192
For instance, to engage linguistic intelligence, we professors could
encourage student participation in class discussion and assign the writing of
student narratives or even traditional research papers. We could urge our
students to get out and interview legal experts or stretch their own
pedagogical muscles by interpreting a chapter of text or otherwise lecturing
their classmates on a legal topic. 193 To create opportunities for our spatially
and visually gifted students, 194 we could assign them to paint, draw, or create
a mockup of an evidentiary exhibit or chart a legal issue. Those whose
spatial gifts give them a computerized bent could learn with computer
programs or even design a software program as a study aid. 95 For our part,
learning cannot be totally abandoned until a cadre of students comes to law school who have not received
their previous education through that methodology).
190 MUNRO, supra note 173, at 72. See also Hess, Heads, supra note 49, at 943 (speaking of law
professors as "collaborators" with students).
191 Gardner speaks of providing "multiple entry points" to learning. GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra
note 10, at 203.
192 Dembowski, supra note 188, at 23. See also Jacobson, supra note 157, at 156. This kind of
experiential learning is nothing new in our profession. It is interesting to recall that, before the Socratic
Method revolutionized law teaching in the late nineteenth century, many law professors were practicing
lawyers, who became "lecturers" on the law and many lawyers gained admission to the bar by "reading"
the law---essentially apprenticing themselves to practicing attorneys. Kerper, supra note 154, at 356-57.
In fact, part of Christopher Columbus Langdell's intention in developing law school's Socratic Method
was to move legal education away from the apprenticeship model. Kaufman, supra note 21, at 251.
However, Howard Gardner, for one, urges a return to greater utilization of an apprenticeship model in
formal education. GARDNER, PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 162. One innovative model is the mandatory
mentorship program at the University of St. Thomas law school where students under the supervision of a
practicing attorney mentor to engage in five real-world lawyering experiences per year, such as attending
a motion hearing, a deposition, or a legislative or regulatory hearing. Patrick J. Schlitz, Making Ethical
Lawyers, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 875, 881 (2004).
193 Turning momentarily to learning theory, such linguistic exercises could capture a cadre of law
students who are oral learners. "Students who are oral learners need to talk out their ideas. These are the
students who frequently contribute to class discussion as their way of processing information or
developing ideas. They are the students who get a D on their appellate brief but win the oral competition.
For oral learners to thrive, they need to have opportunities to talk." Jacobson, supra note 157, at 154.
194 Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Students
Learn, 48 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 402, 412 (1998).
195 For a general discussion of Computer-Aided Instruction, or CAI, see Eagar, supra note 158, at
412-13; see also Margaret M. Hazen & Thomas Lee Hazen, Simulation of Legal Analysis and Instruction
on the Computer, 59 IND. L.J. 195 (1984). An interactive computer program could work well for the
teaching of such subjects as citation. Indeed, several of the major electronic research computers already
have created such programs.
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we instructors could utilize the chalkboard, multimedia, and audiovisual
equipment as much as possible in our teaching.
196
To promote the bodily/kinesthetic intelligence of the actors in our
student ranks, the professor could assign students to perform in mock oral
argument or moot court, 97 participate in simulations, 198 play games such as
charades or jeopardy,' 99 create skits demonstrating a legal principle or
scenario, or use their feet to get out into the community to travel to courts
and other legal institutions to witness lawyering tasks firsthand.200 For those
whose gifts run to music, students could be given the opportunity to write
songs to demonstrate legal principles and we could reward our students when
they exhibit musicality in the form of eloquence into their oral class
performances. Those interpersonally intelligent could interview legal
professionals, team teach a legal concept with other students or the
instructor, participate in team-oriented simulations, projects, and externships,
engage in regular class participation, or assume the role of a legal
stakeholder within the context of the utilization of the problem method.2 ° '
Those whose gifts turn inward could be given the chance to earn
credit for writing a journal reflecting on a legal experience,2 °2 for discussing
the ethics relating to a legal argument,2 3 and earn extra credit for being
diligent in setting and attaining goals regarding the quality and timeliness of
work product.204 The effort grade need not be reserved to elementary school.
Our legal Steven Jay Goulds gifted with naturalistic intelligence could be
called on in class to compare and contrast legal situations and master the art
of the analogy, and our spiritual and existential leaders could be recognized
in a tangible way when they act as leaders in the law school community or
speak up in class about the moral and philosophical content of a legal
debate.2 ° 5
196 Eagar, supra note 158, at 410-11. Also under learning theory, such techniques when employed
by an instructor would be effective in engaging those students who learn best visually, which is important,
as Professor Jacobson asserts, that such learners may be disproportionately represented in the bottom of
the class. Jacobson, supra note 157, at 151-52. For a fascinating example of how visually diagramming a
black letter tort case can work, see Patton, supra note 62, at 13.
197 Lustbader, supra note 193, at 411.
198 See infra pp. 27-31.
'9 Lustbader, supra note 193, at 411.
o This intelligence also correlates to a category under learning theory - tactile and kinesthetic
learners. Although these learners are the least prevalent in the law school ranks, Professor Jacobson notes
that many students whose primary learning style falls in another category could benefit from having their
teaching complemented by tactile or kinesthetic techniques. Jacobson, supra note 157, at 155.
201 See Eagar, supra note 158, at 404-05.
202 Paul S. Ferber, Adult Learning Theory and Simulation-Designing Simulations to Educate
Lawyers, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 417,425 (2002).
203 See Kaufman, supra note 21, at 256.
204 See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 257.
205 See Wong, supra note 29, at 209.
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One vehicle we professors could utilize to promote many of these
opportunities is the classroom simulation. "An effective method to promote
student learning and shift the focus from the teacher to the student is the
'situation method,"' 206 or simulation-"the performance of a lawyering task
* . .using a hypothetical situation which emulates reality., 20 7 According to
Professor Ferber, "simulations allow law students to develop more of [their
multiple intelligences] than does traditional legal education.
'208
Simulations can vary in time duration and scope. One possible category
is the simple simulation. 2° 9 This type of simulation is usually one class in
length, where part of the class session is used to plan, then perform the
simulation, then reflect upon it. An example of simple simulation I use in
my legal writing classes is to give my students instruction on the drafting of
questions presented and argument points for a hypothetical appellate brief,
breaking them out into groups to draft these materials, and then diagramming
their examples on the chalkboard at the end of class. Another commonplace
example in our law schools is the practice of oral arguments, where other
classmates serve as judges.
Another category of simulation that can be utilized is the extended
simulation, which "involves the creation of a complex world and . . . runs
over a significant period of time, seeking to approximate the same duration
as in the real world, and requiring students to engage in multiple tasks.
'" 210
At Howard Law School, the Legal Writing program makes extensive use of
extended simulation. My Legal Writing colleagues and I teach a yearlong IL
course entitled Legal Reasoning, Research, and Writing. The fall semester is
much in the traditional mold, where I lecture, trying to intersperse as much as
possible visual aids, group projects, and class participation. My students are
evaluated on several case briefs and interoffice memos they turn in during
211
the course of the semester.
2W6 MUNRO, supra note 173, at 147, quoting John E. Sexton, The Preconditions of
Professionalism: Legal Education For The Twenty-First Century, 52 MONT. L. REV. 331, 336 (1991).
207 Ferber, supra note 202, at 418. The importance of "learning by doing" has also been
recognized by two additional movements in legal pedagogy: clinical legal education, see Kovach, supra
note 44, at 378, and process-based legal writing. Additionally, a central tenet of andragogy, or adult
learner, pioneered by Malcolm Knowles is that "learning must be experiential for adults, because adults
accumulate a growing reservoir of experience that is a resource for learning." Id. at 374, citing M.
KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION 50 (1970).
208 Ferber, supra note 202, at 438.
209 Id. at 419.
20 Id. at 423.
211 Another simulation program that draws heavily on Howard Gardner's work, as well as Claude
Steele's work on stereotype threat is the Peggy Cooper Davis' Workways Project at the New York
University School of Law. For a description of the workings of that program, see Davis, supra note 2; see
also Farber & Rickenberg, supra note 136, at 271.
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However, the bulk of the second semester is conducted in the
extended simulation model.z 2 From the first day back from winter break,
my students are divided up into two equal-sized law firms.213 They maintain
that role, including the obligations of confidentiality, for the entire semester.
For the last three years, I have used a simulation problem derived from basic
first-year tort law; for instance, this year's issue was a medical malpractice
claim.
On the first day of class, they receive a letter from their client detailing
a legal problem. The problem is articulated in lay language, requiring the
students to spot the legal issue and exercise their traditional intelligences.
The next week, the students formulate law firm strategy and conduct an
intake interview of an actual "client"-tapping into their linguistic,
kinesthetic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, spiritual, and existential
intelligences. Next, the students do additional factual and legal research and
memorialize their impressions of the case in a traditional memo to the file,
again working their traditional intelligences. Then the students are required
to communicate those impressions in an understandable way through a client
letter, particularly tapping into their linguistic and interpersonal
intelligences.214
Following that, the students are paired with a lawyer from the other
side to negotiate a settlement. They are required to meet in multiple
sessions, really putting their kinesthetic intelligence on display through
demeanor and body language. This settlement session ends in the drafting of
a contract, an exacting test of their linguistic and logical skills. The students
are also required to turn into me a detailed, thoughtful "Negotiation Journal"
212 My experience with extended simulations has been confined to the teaching of legal writing;
however, as the subject matter of the extended simulations I have utilized has always been derived from a
first year doctrinal course, I believe this method could be successfully employed in many doctrinal
courses. For instance, Professor Marjorie Silver describes her successful use of simulations during the
teaching of her Professional Responsibility Course. Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal
Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L 1173, 1195 n.127 (1999). Professors Phyllis G. Coleman and
Robert M. Jarvis employ simulations in their first year Contracts class because they want to "correct what
[they] believe is a critical flaw in the typical Contracts class: students complete the course without ever
negotiating, drafting, or even seeing a contract." Phyllis G. Coleman & Robert M. Jarvis, Using Skills
Training to Teach First-Year Contracts, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 725, 725 (1996).
213 This type of group learning may somewhat fly in the face of a law school culture that has "a
tradition of individual performance and competition among students." MUNRO, supra note 173, at 71.
However, the work of Richard Delgado, among others, supports the notion that doing more to support
group learning might be valuable. "[L]aw practice today is much more cooperative than it was in the past,
emphasizing a team approach, use of paralegals, and negotiation." Delgado, Elitism, supra note 10, at 599
n.41. See also Thomas L. Shaffer, Collaboration in Studying Law, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 239, 240 (1973).
"[T]he benefits of collaborative exercises are multiple. They give students an opportunity to form social
bonds that decrease their feelings of alienation," as well as giving them an opportunity to learn from one
another. Lustbader, Context, supra note 193, at 415, citing DAVID W. JOHNSON ET AL., ACTIVE
LEARNING: COOPERATION IN THE COLLEGE CLASSROOM (1991).
214 Farber & Rickenberg, supra note 136, at 282.
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reflecting on the negotiation process, including discussion of their strategy
and reduxing their outcome, an exercise more intrapersonal than most they
will perform in law school.215
Then, always through some deus ex machina on my part, the contracts
ultimately are not signed, the negotiations break down, and the students end
with writing a traditional memorandum in support of, or in opposition to, a
litigation motion, usually a motion to dismiss. The motion is then orally
argued in court, putting linguistic, kinesthetic, and interpersonal skills once
again on display. Throughout the semester, we debrief and reflect on the
process in class, sometimes the entire class, sometimes in law firm teams.
The entire exercise requires the intrapersonal intelligence of stamina,
discipline, and insight. It also requires intelligences in the vein of
naturalistic, spiritual, and existential thinking, such as the ability to prioritize
and put matters in context, the ability to grasp far-reaching consequences,
leadership skills, and demonstration of morality and diplomacy.216
The endeavor is extremely engaging and the students are most
217enthusiastic l. Students have reported that the simulation makes the law
relevant to them and that they are inspired by seeing a real world application
to the principles they are learning in class. 218 "[S]tudents like to participate,
215 The use of journals in the simulation context has also been described by Professor Ferber, who
states, "The journal can enhance learning in at least three ways. First, by requiring the students to reflect
on the action they will take, including analyzing the problem, considering the alternatives, evaluating the
pros and cons of each alternative, deciding which alternative to adopt and then implementing it, students
learn how to engage in a planning process. Second, by requiring students to record the results of their
planning and implementation and to evaluate their planning and implementation, students learn to engage
in self-evaluation. Third, by requiring the students to articulate their understanding of the applicable law
in connection with their planning and implementation, students learn how to use legal analysis in solving
real problems." Ferber, supra note 202, at 425. Professor Paula Lustbader has also encouraged the use of
journalwriting in legal education. Paula Lustbader, From Dreams to Reality: The Emerging Role of Law
School Academic Support Programs, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 839, 849 (1997). See also James R. Elkins, Rites
de Passage: Law Students "Telling Their Lives", 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 27 (1985).
216 For the purposes of law school, there are negative consequences for those students who call
each other names, engage in ad hominem attacks, or make their opponents cry, which, unfortunately,
happens every year.
217 My experience with student enthusiasm in participating in simulations, as evidenced
anecdotally by such indicia as 11:00 PM phone calls from students excitedly filling me in on the next
day's strategy, has been borne out by the observations of other instructors. "Many instructors, especially
clinical teachers, have found that simulations provide students with 'greater motivation to learn than
methods such as lectures, discussions and case studies."' Patton, supra note 62, at 9 n.25, citing Paul
Bergman et al., Learning from Experience: Nonlegally-Specific Role Plays, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535, 538
(1987). Professors Coleman and Jarvis report that "[a]nother reason to use simulations is that for the vast
majority of students simulations help to lessen boredom, particularly once the novelty of law school has
worn off." Coleman & Jarvis, supra note 212, at 727 n.3. See also Joseph D. Harbaugh, Simulation and
Gaming: A Teaching/Learning Strategy for Clinical Legal Education, in CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION:
REPORT OF THE AALS-ABA COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 191, 203
(1980).
218 "Role-playing exercises in which students put into context what they are leaming help them
understand why they will need the information and how they will use it." Lustbader, Context, supra note
193, at 412.
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and they will learn in order to able to be participate; and . . . active
participation and identification with a problem or role encourages relevant
study.,
2 19
As an added fringe benefit to counter some of the possible prejudices
inhering in traditional legal pedagogy and testing, Professor Weinstein has
posited that "the life experiences of students of color have given them more
experience with negotiation and they are better at it than their classmates,
220
thus. narrowing the grade gap between students of color and Caucasians.
221
Additionally, at least one study has indicated that women tend to perform
better in simulations than they do in the traditional evaluation model, perhaps
reflecting the simulation's increased emphasis on linguistic and interpersonal
skills. 222  Perhaps, most significantly, using simulations to provide "more
varied evaluation formats, ' ,22 3 can encourage and value an entire cadre of
promising lawyers who might otherwise be overlooked:
The over-reliance on exams fails to identify the group of students
whose simulation performance provides evidence of their
indication of probable success in many lawyer roles .... If, for
example, we accept that the personal intelligences are really
independent valuable abilities in the world, we might begin to
prize skillful client counseling more than we do. If we coupled
that awareness with an effort to identify our students [sic]
aptitudes in the personal intelligences, we could help students
develop a professional role around their strengths. Students with
those strengths might more often see direct client service as an
important and challenging career, rather than a path for those who
did not get jobs at the biggest law firms. They could make better
informed decisions about whether or not to work to improve in
some areas and how to plan and prepare for their particular careers
as lawyers. Students with traditionally recognized strengths might
also be a little more humble and learn that writing high scoring
exams is one valuable aptitude among a constellation of abilities.
219 Eagar, supra note 158, at 403.
220 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 282 n.100.
221 As a teacher at a historically black law school, with a student body approximately 85%
African-American, at least anecdotally I have appreciated a flair and level of engagement in my students
while doing simulations that is sometimes lacking in the more traditional lecture format. Other
instructors, as well, have reported experiences similar to mine with successful simulations and have noted
that students that performed poorly on Blue Book examinations thrived under this model. See MUNRO,
supra note 173, at 145-46. In the context of the clinic, Professor Burman has reported that "class rank
appears to have little correlation with students' performance." Burman, supra note 171, at 449.
222 It should be noted that Professors Farber and Rickenberg did find that women felt less
competent during the simulation, although the measurable outcomes were equally successful. Farber,
supra note 136, at 302. But see Weinstein, supra note 7, at 281-82 (concluding that men outperform
women in simulations).
223 Id. at 285.
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We do our students, and the profession, a disservice by graduating
many students who feel unrecognized and were in fact not
educated as well as they could have been, by their law schools.
2 24
V.
Professor Weinstein's observations are commensurate with my own
experiences with the potential of utilizing MI theory as a potential career
counseling device. My experiences with seeing students who struggled with
office memos trounce the competition in a negotiation, light up in front of a
courtroom, or impress with the sensitivity and perceptiveness displayed in a
journal persuade me that an appreciation of a student's particular
intelligences could be invaluable in the student career counseling in which
we all engage.225
Perhaps surprisingly, there is a paucity of scholarship applying the
Gardner theory to the legal employment context. We law professors might
argue that career counseling in any capacity is the realm of the law school
career counseling offices set up for that purpose and certainly the
hardworking people in those offices could benefit from a thorough
understanding of the principles of multiple intelligences. Probably some of
the career services officers are already versed in the theory. However, we
law professors would be remiss if we did not step in to mentor as well,226 as
we are uniquely situated to see these intelligences in action.
227
It is an open secret in law schools, despite administrative and faculty
rhetoric about social engineering and the commonweal, which the traditional
law firm model still prevails as the Holy Grail of employment for students at
many law schools. Despite efforts of many law schools to offer public
interest advisors and programs to educate about employment alternatives,
students, particularly our top-ranked students, gravitate toward the big firm
224 Id. at 285-86.
225 Apparently, my views are shared by consumer advocate and presidential aspirant Ralph Nader,
who, in 1991, told an audience at Hofstra Law School that "[b]y use of [standardized] tests, we ignore all
kinds of other multiple intelligences that people develop in one form or the other, and we make our career
choices based upon our performance on a multiple choice exam .... So we go through all of this while
these tests do not test the most important features of our personalities; those that will spell success in our
lives. Nor do they purport to. They do not test our judgment, experience, wisdom, creativity,
imagination, idealism, stamina or determination. Otherwise, they test everything." Ralph Nader,
Leadership and the Law, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 543, 550-551 (1991).
226 Indeed, Professor Patrick J. Schlitz of St. Thomas Law School laments that we do too little
mentoring of any kind, as law professors are placed under increased pressure to devote their time to
scholarship and student mentoring is perceived as not beneficial for careers. Schlitz, supra note 192, at
879.
227 Legal Writing professors are particularly well-suited, as legal writing pedagogy usually
incorporates more one-on-one interaction and conferencing than is usually possible in a large section,
doctrinal course.
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and the big paycheck. We also all know that, for many reasons that I assert
pertain to a student's constellation of strengths and weaknesses in multiple
intelligences, not every student is destined for success in the law firm
context.
As a professor, it is gratifying to be able to tell the student who is
feeling like a square peg in a round hole because, for whatever reason, they
are not drawn to or do not fit into the law firm mold, "You are gifted in
dealing with others. Consider mediation." "You have a profound grasp of
the spiritual and ethical. Consider public interest work." Again, by
broadening our definition of what constitutes talent and success, we ennoble
career options for our students that might previously have been regarded as
failure.
Even within the law firm context, an appreciation of a student's
multiple intelligences, while not locking the student into anything, can help
you steer them in the right direction. "You have superior linguistic and
kinesthetic skills. Consider litigation." "Your personal intelligence makes
you an unstoppable negotiator. Consider a transactional practice." Any
knowledge we can bring to bear to demystify the student's elusive process of
finding their life's work is one of the greatest services we can perform for
our students and for the profession.228
VI.
One could argue that law school is functioning just fine in its
traditional mold, and those that have difficulty with that model should either
not attend law school or just "learn to adapt better to its rigors. ,229 Professor
Sturm tells us that "[o]ne possible response to [the] critique of the gladiator
model of legal education is to locate the problem with those who do not fare
well within it, rather than on the model itself. This response rests on the
assumption that this model dominates the profession, and thus it is crucial
that students be socialized to operate within it. ''23° However, to paraphrase
Professor Lani Guinier, it is law school, not the non-traditional law student,
that should change, and "indeed that changes to the existing structure of law
school might improve the quality of legal education for all students." 23' As
228 Of course, such a campaign could inspire a provocative examination of what kind of lawyers
we legal educators are trying to produce in the first place. "Defining what kind of lawyer that would be
presents an interesting problem, requiring study of law school curricula and culture. Most law schools,
and particularly elite schools, aspire to train judges and policy makers. In fact, they turn out many
transactional lawyers and civil litigators." Weinstein, supra Note 7, at 285 n.106.
229 Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences At One Ivy-League Law
School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1994).
230 Sturm, supra note 6, at 132.
231 Guinier, supra note 229, at 29.
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we are a diverse and pluralistic society, it can only help the academy to
produce well-trained lawyers with a diversity of gifts.
232
We must remember, "[L]aw students are adult learners. As such,
they learn best when they are treated as adults. A significant aspect of adult
learning methodology is that adult learners should be treated with the respect
that is often missing from traditional law school teaching practices., 233  It is
important that, for our adult law students, their law school experiences
should be placed in the context of their larger life.234 This goal of respectful
legal education is increasingly being accomplished for the struggling student
23through academic support programs. Our challenge is to accomplish this
for the average student, or even for the student who may be extraordinary in
a way that may have gone unrecognized in the past.
236
I have been working at Howard Law School adopting its credo that it
is important to turn out well-educated African-American attorneys for
reasons including maximizing the effectiveness of representation for the
African-American community.237  I think this same logic can apply to
individuals with a diversity of intellectual gifts. Professor Sturm has stated
that "It may be that the profession has diversified to the point that no single,
central, organizing paradigm will be adequate. At the least, the overarching
concept of professionalism may need to be one that is inclusive, if not
integrative, of a variety of roles and functions."238  When new voices are
heard, "[tihis, in turn, will provide an opportunity for non-diverse students to
232 Consider the following statistics as to how much the gender and racial composition of our
profession has changed over the last thirty years. "In academic year 1971-72, the law student [population
was 91% male, 9% female, 94% white and 6% minority. In academic year 1999-2000, the law student
population was 53% male, 47% female, 81% white, and 19% minority. In 28 years, female enrollment
increased nearly 700% and minority enrollment increased 450%." Jacobson, supra note 157 n.3, citing
American Bar Association Data, at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/atatistics/stats.html (last visited June
30, 2000).
233 Lustbader, supra note 215, at 856; see also KNOWLES, supra note 207, at 41; Gerald F. Hess,
Listening to Our Students: Obstructing and Enhancing Learning in Law School, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 941,
942 (1997); and Hess, Heads, supra note 49, at 87.
234 Jacobson, supra note 157, at 170, citing KNOWLES, supra note 207, at 9-12.
235 See Lustbader, supra note 215.
236 Another concern for law students is the problem of isolation, which might disproportionately
affect students of color, older students, and other non-traditional students and stand in the way of their
success in law school, regardless of their qualifications coming in. Roach, supra note 49, at 675. The
incorporation of multiple intelligence theory in our pedagogy could work toward alleviating such
problems. See id. at 679.
237 Professor Lustbader has noted the significance of the ability of lawyers to "traverse between
their communities and the legal system." Lustbader, supra note 215, at 858. Certainly this was one of the
concerns of Charles Hamilton Houston in the 1930s in his leadership of the Howard University School of
Law. Citing the 1930 census, Houston pointed out that at the time there were only 1,230 black lawyers in
the United States, compared with 159,735 white lawyers. Wong, supra note 29, at 206 n.101, citing
Charles H. Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, J. NEGRO. EDUC., Jan. 1935, at 49, 51; see also
Simeon, supra note 126, at 369.
238 Sturm, supra note 6, at 135.
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learn about and understand the experiences, values, and voices of many of
their future clients.'
239
Thus, along with a vote for inclusivity, I conclude with an entreaty
for integrity. The best thing we can do for our students is to value and
nurture their unique potential. So, for all you linguistic geniuses out there:
This above all: to thine own self be true.
And it must follow, as the night the day,
240Thou canst not then be false to any man.
239 Lustbader, supra note 215, at 859.
240 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, se. 3.
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